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COMMENTS
PATERNITY STATUTES: THWARTING EQUAL PROTECTION
FOR ILLEGITIMATES
SUSAN E. WILLS*
When measured against United States Supreme Court deci-
sions since 1968 and the newly evolved standards they embody
in equal protection for illegitimate children, the Florida statute
for the determination of paterntity is constitutionally infirm in
three areas: restrictions on standing, statute of limitations, and
its fixed schedule of support obligation. A review of current statu-
tory and case law throughout the United States will demonstrate
the urgent need for the adoption in Florida and elsewhere of the
Uniform Parentage Act.
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I. SOME STATISTICS
Illegitimate children cannot be characterized as a vocal minor-
ity. Any improvement in their lives has come from the persistent
efforts of a few commentators' to catch the conscience of the courts
and legislatures. A mention of some recent statistics will reveal the
enormity of the problem.
The number of registered illegitimate births has increased from
a total of 141,600 in the United States in 1950 (or 3.9 percent of all
births) to 407,300 in 1973 (or 13 percent of all births).' In many
urban areas the rate of illegitimate births exceeds 40 percent; in
some cities more than half of all births are illegitimate.'
According to a recent report by the Planned Parenthood Asso-
ciation,4 one million teenage girls (1 in 10) become pregnant an-
1. The ubiquitous Harry D. Krause is unrivalled in the quantity and value of his contri-
butions which include: ILLEGITrmAcY: LAW AND SOCIAL POuCY (1971); Bastards Abroad, For-
eign Approaches to Illegitimacy, 15 Am. J. COMP. L. 726 (1966-1967); The Bastard Finds His
Father, 3 FAM. L.Q. 100 (1969); with Polesky, Blood Typing in Disputed Paternity Cases,
Capabilities of American Laboratories, 10 FAm. L.Q. 287 (1976); Bringing the Bastard into
the Great Society, A Proposed Uniform Act on Legitimacy, 44 TEx. L. REv. 829 (1966); Child
Welfare, Parental Responsibility and the State, 6 FAM. L.Q. 377 (1972); Equal Protection for
the Illegitimate, 65 MICH. L. RED. 477 (1967); Legitimate and Illegitimate Offspring of Levy
v. Louisiana-First Decisions on Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CHI. L. REv. 338
(1969); The Non-Marital Child-New Conceptions for the Law of Unlawfulness, 1 FAM. L.Q.
1 (1967); Scientific Evidence and the Ascertainment of Paternity, 5 FAM. L.Q. 252 (1971); The
Uniform Parentage Act, 8 FAM. L.Q. 1 (1974).
2. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract (1976) at 58.
3. Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines: Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems of Dis-
puted Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247 (1976).
4. The report is entitled "Eleven Million Teenagers" and was quoted in The Washington
Post, June 5, 1977 (Parade) at 4, Col. 1.
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nually. Three hundred thousand pregnancies result in abortion and
in another 300,000 cases the mothers are married when conception
occurs. 200,000 children of these girls are born illegitimate and
100,000 achieve legitimacy through the mother's subsequent mar-
riage.'
I. DISCRIMINATION
Children are not self-supporting. Their survival depends on
support from parents, private social welfare agencies, or the state.'
When the child is illegitimate there is a far greater possibility that
the mother will be unable to provide adequately for the child and,
thus, the burden of support will shift to the state7 unless the father
is identified and his obligation enforced. Morally, logically, and
legally, the duty of child support should fall on those who are re-
sponsible for the child's being. Unfortunately, since the primary
purpose of the parental support statutes was, and to an extent still
is, to relieve the state by imposing the burden of the child's mainte-
nance on the father, the adequacy of support was determined at a
survival level; the welfare of the child was a secondary consideration
if, indeed, present at all.
The earliest paternity statute in our legal heritage sets a preju-
dicial moral tone which is reflected even today in paternity legisla-
tion, although modern legislators are careful to employ far more
neutral language.' Prejudice against illegitimate children results
from society's organizational need to encourage marriage, deter
extra-marital sexual relations and prevent disruption of the family
5. Id.
6. Levy & Duncan, The Impact of Roe v. Wade on Paternal Support Status: A Constitu-
tional Analysis, 10 FAM. L.Q. 179, 180 (1976).
7. Id.
8. An Act for Setting the Poor on Work, 1576, 18 Eliz. 1, c.3 § 2 quoted in Krause,
Scientific Evidence and the Ascertainment of Paternity, 5 FAM. L.Q. 252, 252 (1971):
Concerning bastards begotten and born out of lawful matrimony (an offense God's
law and man's law) the said bastards being now left to be kept at the charges of
the parish where they be born, to the great burden of the same parish, and in
defrauding of the relief of the impotent and aged true poor of the same parish,
and to the evil example and encouragement of the lewd life: (2) It is ordained and
enacted by the authority aforesaid, That two justices of the Peace (whereof one
to be of the quorum, in or next unto the limits where the parish church is, within
which parish such bastard shall be born, upon examination of the cause and
circumstance) shall and may be their discretion take order, as well for the punish-
ment of the mother and reputed father of such bastard child, as also for the better
relief of every such parish in part or in all; (3) and shall and may likewise by such
discretion take order for the keeping of every such bastard child, by charging such
mother or reputed father with the payment of money weekly or other sustenation
for the relief of such child, in such wise as they shall think meet and convenient.
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unit.' Early in history, a dual system of families developed: the
conventional family and the inferior family, distinguished by the
absence of marriage. 0 Legal discrimination against the members of
the inferior family by denying them the substantive legal rights and
duties of the traditional family" was meant to discourage promiscu-
ity. It has failed. The mother's knowledge that her illicit sexual
activity may produce a child who will be discriminated against
legally has little or no deterrent value. The complete immunity from
parental obligations enjoyed by fathers of illegitimates who evade
acknowledgment and adjudication of paternity certainly has no sal-
utary effect on the state's interest in promoting marriage and dis-
couraging promiscuity."
The argument in favor of discrimination to prevent disruption
of the family unit plainly envisions a traditional family whose
husband-father has begotten an illegitimate child by an unmarried
woman. It balances the need of the former, acceptable unit against
those of the latter, "inferior" family which his activities have cre-
ated. The mental anguish of the wife and economic loss to her fam-
ily should her husband be required to support the "accidental"
child, prevail over the need of the illegitimate child to be supported.
Disregarding the questionable value judgments implicit in this ar-
gument, the "scenario" is no longer typical of American life. "More
than one-quarter of American children-more than one-half of the
black children-are not living with their biological fathers.' 3
Eighty-three percent of the families nationwide who received Aid to
Families with Dependent Children (AFDC) assistance in 1973 quali-
9. See generally, Davis, Illegitimacy and the Social Structure, 45 AM. J. Soc. 215 (1939);
Krause, Equal Protection for the Illegitimate, 65 MIcH. L. Ra'. 477 (1967).
10. Wallach & Tenoso, A Vindication of the Rights of the Unmarried Mothers and Their
Children: An Analysis of the Institution of Illegitimacy, Equal Protection, and the Uniform
Parentage Act, 23 U. KAN. L. Rav. 23, 24 (1974).
11. Id.
12. Even if we assume, closing our eyes to the soaring illegitimate birth rate,
that a woman will refrain from illicit sexual activity in order to avoid bearing a
child who will be denied paternal support, there is no basis for the conclusion that
the Equal Protection Clause permits resort to this practice of vicarious expiation.
Nor can it be seriously contended that the governmental purpose of promoting
marriage and discouraging sexual promiscuity is promoted by a rule which guar-
antees to the rake immunity from liability for the support of the children born as
a result of his extramarital copulative prformance [sic).
G_ v. P , 466 S.W.2d 41, 45 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (Cadena, J., dissent-
ing) (quoting Krause, Equal Protection and Paternity, 36 U. CI. L. REv. 338, 347 n.34
(1969)), reu'd sub nom. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
13. Miami Herald, March 2, 1977, at 1, col. 2. Findings of a survey sponsored by the
Foundation for Child Development, conducted by Temple University's Institute for Survey
Research.
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fled because the father was absent from home."
Furthermore, this argument accepts as desirable a father's free
choice in deciding whether or not his children will be legitimate.
Through legitimation or adoption, or through marriage to the
mother, a father can bestow rights on the child which marital chil-
dren enjoy from birth. The father can also choose to withhold these
rights. 5
Courts have justified the different support obligations owed by
the father to his marital and non-marital children by reasoning that
a father assumes the duty to support the children of the marriage
as an incident of the marriage contract. The child is a third-party
beneficiary under this consent theory." The theory is premised on
the contention that children owe their right to support to the exist-
ence of marriage. 7 "In fact, marriage owes its existence to the
necessity that children be supported."'" The fallacy of the consent
theory is apparent when we recognize that the, support duty would
be imposed on a father even if he were expressly to agree with his
wife not to assume it.9
These long-held beliefs are changing. 0 The legal impediments
to the illegitimate child's right to support, to inheritance and to
welfare benefits contingent on paternal dependency are being elimi-
nated, principally through the application of the equal protection
clause.
14. U.S. Dep't of Commerce, Bureau of the Census, Statistical Abstract (1976) at 20.
15. These rights include support, inheritance, benefit of federal and state welfare laws,
use of the father's name, and the father's right to custody and visitation.
16. E.g., Baston v. Sears, 15 Ohio St. 2d 166, 168, 239 N.E.2d 62, 63-64 (1968), overruled,
Franklin v. Julian, 30 Ohio St. 2d 228, 283 N.E.2d 813 (1972).
17. G - v. P , 466 S.W.2d 41, 46 (Tex. Civ. App. 1971) (Cadena, J.,
dissenting).
18. Id. (quoting 1 Westermark, HISTORY OF HUMAN MARMAGE 72 (1921)).
19. G _ v. P , 466 S.W.2d at 46.
20. Society is becoming progressively more aware that children deserve pro-
per care, comfort, and protection even if they are illegitimate. The burden of
illegitimacy in purely social relationships should be enough without society add-
ing unnecessarily to the burden with legal implications having to do with care,
health, and welfare of children.
Armijo v. Wesselius, 440 P.2d 471, 473 (Wash. 1968). (Wrongful death statute cannot consti-
tutionally deny an illegitimate infant the right to claim and recover damages for the wrongful
death of his or her parent).
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III. EQUAL PROTECTION
A. An Overview of Standards
1. INTRODUCTION
Equal protection is generally understood to mean that a legisla-
tive classification must include all and only those persons who are
similarly situated with respect to the law's legitimate governmental
purpose.' Since few classifications are totally accurate, formulas
have been used to determine permissible degrees of under- or over-
inclusiveness."
The United States Supreme Court fashioned a two-tiered ap-
proach to equal protection challenges 4 in an effort to reduce the
"endless tinkering with legislative judgments" 5 which character-
ized pre-1937 Supreme Court decisions involving substantive due
process. Minimal judicial scrutiny embodied in the reasonable rela-
tionship test has been applied to most legislation. Under the com-
pelling state interest test, strict judicial scrutiny has been applied
to legislation affecting either a suspect class of persons or, more
recently, fundamental personal rights.
The dichotomy is easy to understand and simple to apply, and
for that reason it is commendable. However, the Court's two-tiered
approach has resulted in rigid, automatic determinations which
have afforded infrequent individual relief. In all but one Supreme
Court case" between 1937 and 1970 to which the reasonable rela-
tionship test was applied, the legislative classification has been
upheld. Conversely, in only one case27 involving strict scrutiny of a
suspect category has the Court upheld the legislative classification.
2. RATIONAL BASIS STANDARD
The Court traditionally analyzes equal protection cases in three
steps: firstly, identifying the trait which forms the basis of the clas-
21. See Tussman & tenBroek, The Equal Protection of the Laws, 37 CAUF. L. REv. 341
(1949).
22. "A classification having some reasonable basis does not offend against that clause
merely because it is not made with mathematical nicety or because in practice it results in
some inequality." Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911).
23. Comment, Fundamental Personal Rights: Another Approach to Equal Protection, 40
U. CI. L. REv. 807, 809 (1973).
24. These standards were first described in United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304
U.S. 144, 152-53 & n.4 (1938) (plurality opinion) (dictum).
25. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 777 (1977) (Rehnquist, J.) (dissenting opinion).
26. Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457 (1957), overruled, New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297,
306 (1976).
27. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
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sification; secondly, discerning the purpose of the law; thirdly, scru-
tinizing the relationship between the trait and the purpose."8 The
extremely permissible standard of McGowan v. Maryland9 has be-
come most commonly cited"0 for the reasonable relationship for-
mula:
The constitutional safeguard is offended only if the classification
rests on grounds wholly irrelevant to the achievement of the
State's objective. State legislatures are presumed to have acted
within their constitutional power despite the fact that, in prac-
tice, their laws result in some inequality. A statutory discrimina-
tion will not be set aside if any state of facts reasonably may be
conceived to justify it.3'
3. SUSPECT CLASSIFICATIONS
Since the Fourteenth Amendment grew out of the Civil War
and the emancipation of the slaves, the equal protection clause was
naturally aimed at legislation which discriminated against blacks.
In Korematsu v. United States32 the Court added classifications
based on any other racial group to the umbrella of strict scrutiny
protection. Two categories in addition to race" have been identified
by the Court as being suspect: alienage4 and ancestry."
The labelling of a classification as suspect does not automati-
cally preclude constitutionality. In Korematsu the Court indicated
that "[p]ressing public necessity"3 justified the relocation of per-
sons of Japanese descent, including both American citizens and
aliens, to detention camps during the Second World War. In addi-
tion, legislation aimed at a particular group with a non-
discriminatory purpose, for example, to compensate that group for
prior state discrimination, would be permissible if it could with-
stand a challenge of reverse discrimination. 7 Strict scrutiny re-
28. Comment, Equal Protection in Transition: An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 FORDHAM
L. REV. 605, 606-07 (1973).
29. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
30. Comment, supra note 28, at 617.
31. McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425-26 (1961) (emphasis added).
32. 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
33. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); McLaughlin v. Florida, 379 U.S. 184 (1964);
Boiling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497 (1954); Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214 (1944).
34. In re Griffiths, 413 U.S. 717 (1973); Sugarman v. Dougall, 413 U.S. 634 (1973);
Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971); Takahashi v. Fish and Game Comm'n, 334 U.S.
410 (1948).
35. Oyama v. California, 332 U.S. 633 (1948).
36. Korematsu v. United States, 323 U.S. 214, 216 (1944).
37. See Bakke v. Regents of the Univ. of Calif., 18 Cal. 32, 34, 553 P.2d 1152, 132 Cal.
Rptr. 680 (1976), cert. granted, 429 U.S. 1090 (1977); Carter v. Gallagher, 452 F.2d 315 (8th
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quires the demonstration that the statute "promote[s] a compel-
ling governmental interest"3 to save the classificatory scheme.
Language in the earlier decisions involving the classifications of
illegitimacy39 and sex4" was equivocal. More recent decisions have
now firmly rejected the possibility that illegitimacy and sex would
join the very restrictive category of suspect classifications.,,
4. FUNDAMENTAL PERSONAL RIGHTS
Skinner v. Oklahoma42 was the first attempt by the Court to
apply the strict scrutiny test to a non-suspect class. The Court
found that Oklahoma's Habitual Criminal Sterilization Act in-
volved "one of the basic civil rights of man"-the right to pro-
create. 3 Other fundamental personal rights which have been identi-
fied by the Court are: the right to criminal appeals, 4  the free exer-
cise of religion, 5 privacy in marital decision,46 the right to vote,47
marriage,4" freedom of political association,"9 freedom of interstate
travel,50 and the right to terminate pregnancy in the first tri-
mester."
5. THE Reed FORMULA
In 1971 the Reed v. Reed" decision engendered a major break-
through in equal protection analysis, thereby significantly easing
the tensions of the bipolar approach. Presented with a sex-based
classification giving preference to males in qualifying as estate ad-
ministrators, the Court was not prepared to declare sex a suspect
category. Nor was it prepared to uphold the statutory discrimina-
Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 950 (1972); DeFunis v. Odegaard, 82 Wash. 2d 11, 507 P.2d
1169 (1973), vacated, 416 U.S. 312 (1974) (moot).
38. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 634 (1969) (emphasis omitted).
39. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973) (per curiam); Glona v. American Guar. &
Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Lousiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
40. Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 677, 684-86 (1973) (plurality opinion). Contra,
Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
41. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976) (illegitimacy).
42. 316 U.S. 535 (1942).
43. Id. at 541.
44. Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12 (1956).
45. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
46. Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965).
47. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
48. Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967).
49. Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23 (1968).
50. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618 (1969).
51. Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
52. 404 U.S. 71 (1971).
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tion. A new standard was needed and it was adopted from the there-
tofore infrequently cited opinion of F.S. Royster Guano Co. v.
Virginia. 53
The Equal Protection Clause of [the Fourteenth Amendment]
does, however, deny to States the power to legislate that different
treatment be accorded to persons placed by a statute into differ-
ent classes on the basis of criteria wholly unrelated to the objec-
tive of that statute. A classification 'must be reasonable, not
arbitrary, and must rest upon some ground of difference having
a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation, so
that all persons similarly circumstanced shall be treated alike.""
The Reed (Guano) test differs from the traditional equal pro-
tection standard in two respects.55 Firstly, it does not require a mere
absence of irrationality to validate a statute. The new requirement
is that the classification "rest upon some ground of difference hav-
ing a fair and substantial relation to the object of the legislation.""
The shift may impose an affirmative duty on the party defending
the statute to demonstrate a rational connection between the objec-
tive of the statute and the classification chosen to effectuate that
goal. Secondly, the relation must now be fair and substantial, rather
than merely rational. This newly recognized standard clearly lays
the way for findings of unconstitutionality outside the scope of sus-
pect classifications and fundamental personal rights. During the
1971 term following the Reed decision, six of the nine equal protec-
tion cases (all decided without resort to strict scrutiny) found viola-
tions of the equal protection clause.57
The effect of the Reed decision on the validity of Labine v.
Vincent" is uncertain. In Labine, the Court upheld discrimination
against acknowledged illegitimate children using a standard even
less demanding than the minimum rational basis test.59 Giving great
deference to the power of the State to legislate in the area of intes-
tate succession, the Court eschewed intelligent analysis of the rela-
tionship between the State's objectives and the classifications
drawn to further them. Reed, eight months later, permitted the
53. 253 U.S. 412, 415 (1920).
54. 404 U.S. at 75-76 (citations omitted).
55. Analysis in this paragraph adapted from: Comment, Equal Protection in Transition:
An Analysis and a Proposal, 41 FORDHAM L. Rxv. 605, 614-18 (1973).
56. 253 U.S. at 415.
57. James v. Strange, 407 U.S. 128 (1972); Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972);
Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438 (1972)
(invalidating in part only).
58. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
59. See text accompanying notes 100-02 infra.
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Court to tamper with the statutory scheme in order to equalize
opportunities for women to become estate administrators. Surely
acting as an administrator is of less consequence than sharing in the
estate of one's father.
Reed ought to be interpreted as overruling Labine sub silentio,
but state legislatures and courts, reluctant to put illegitimates on a
parity with legitimate children, will probably distinguish the case
on other grounds.
Inexplicably, the Court in Trimble v. Gordon0 adopts the Reed
standard as part of its opinion but does not expressly overrule
Labine. Trimble is the first Supreme Court case since Labine to deal
with intestacy laws that discriminate against illegitimates. An Illi-
nois statute that excludes an illegitimate from sharing in the intes-
tate estate of his father was found to deny equal protection.'
6. THE Weber TEST
Six months after the Reed Court gave new vitality to the two-
tiered approach to equal protection challenges by resurrecting a
meaningful minimum standard, the Court in Weber v. Aetna Cas-
ualty & Surety Co. ,2 without mentioning Guano or Reed, ostensibly
embarked on yet another avenue of analysis:
Though the latitude given state economic and social regulation
is necessarily broad, when state statutory classifications ap-
proach sensitive and fundamental personal rights, this Court ex-
ercises a stricter scrutiny ..... The essential inquiry in all the
foregoing cases is, however, inevitably a dual one: What legiti-
mate state interest does the classification promote? What funda-
mental personal rights might the classification endanger? 3
The Court found a Louisiana Workmen's Compensation classi-
ficatory scheme"4 which gave priority to legitimate and acknowl-
edged illegitimate children over unacknowledged illegitimate chil-
dren, to be violative of equal protection principles.65 However, the
basis for this holding was not clearly articulated. Moreover, the new
60. 430 U.S. 762 (1977).
61. A discussion of Trimble is found in the text accompanying notes 161-68 and 203 infra.
62. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
63. Id. at 172-73.
64. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 23.1232(1)-(8) (West 1964); LA. CIv. CODE, Arts. 202, 203, 204
(1972).
65. The Workmen's Compensation benefits were entirely satisfied by the amount of a
tort settlement brought on behalf of the four legitimate children whose entitlement totally
exhausted the benefits, leaving nothing for the two unacknowledged, but dependent, illegiti-
mate children.
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"hybrid""6 test which was devised in Weber for the whole spectrum
of equal protection challenges apparently was not even utilized. The
Court gave no indication of what right, approaching a sensitive and
fundamental personal right, was endangered by the priority classifi-
cation. Instead, Justice Powell concluded that the classification
bore "no significant relationship to those recognized purposes of
recovery which workmen's compensation statutes commendably
serve," 7 and that "the classification is justified by no legitimate
state interest, compelling or otherwise." 8 If "significant" means the
same thing as "fair and substantial" the Reed test has been covertly
applied.
Powell's opinion in Weber gives no guidelines as to which state
interests are legitimate and which are not. Two state interests were
reflected in the workmen's compensation statute: the promotion of
legitimate family relationships and the efficiency of administrative
determination of eligibility. These are both recognized as legitimate
state interests. 9
Finally, the eloquent, emotional language at the close of the
Weber opinion dilutes its precedential value from an analytic stand-
point.
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages
society's condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds
of marriage. But visiting this condemnation on the head of an
infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabilities on
the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our sys-
tem that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individ-
ual responsibility or wrongdoing. Obviously, no child is responsi-
ble for his birth and penalizing the illegitimate child is an ineffec-
tual-as well as unjust-way of deterring the parent. Courts are
powerless to prevent the social opprobrium suffered by these hap-
less children, but the Equal Protection Clause does enable us to
strike down discriminatory laws relating to status of birth
where-as in this case-the classification is justified by no legiti-
mate state interest, compelling or otherwise. 0
Powell appears to have invoked the due process principle which
precludes a state from punishing persons for their status, as opposed
to acts, over which they have no control.7 This is an established
66. Weber v. Aetna, Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 181 (1972).
67. Id. at 175.
68. Id. at 176.
69. E.g., Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972). See quotation in note 155, infra.
70. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175-76 (footnotes omitted).
71. See note 82 and text accompanying notes 80-82.
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constitutional doctrine and arguably could defeat all legal discrimi-
nation against illegitimates. A standard of strict scrutiny would
then be appropriate. It is regretable that Powell failed to elevate this
principle to the level of an alternative holding. Despite the fact that
it was allowed to remain dicta, the Court has invoked the passage
like a talisman in later opinions to buttress its analysis.72
B. Application of Equal Protection Principles to Illegitimacy:
Levy to Trimble
The irregular line of illegitimacy cases will be sketched in this
section, principally focusing on their value as precedent. If a com-
mon thread can be found in the nine opinions73 it is that the dicta
is as articulate as the constitutional analysis is unintelligible.
1. Levy AND Glona
Levy v. Louisiana" and Glona v. American Guarantee & Liabil-
ity Insurance Co.75 are the first two cases in which the Court dealt
with illegitimacy." Levy and Glona found that Louisiana's wrongful
death statute violated equal protection by denying recovery to de-
pendent, unacknowledged, illegitimate children for the wrongful
death of their mother and recovery by a mother for the wrongful
death of her illegitimate child.
The standard which Justice Douglas articulates in Levy centers
on whether the end result is a rational one. 7 He notes that the Court
has been "extremely sensitive when it comes to basic civil rights,""s
and identifies the rights here as "involv[ing] the intimate, familial
relationship between a child and his own mother."79 He does not,
however, specify which level of scrutiny is to be applied. Recovery
72. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 506 (1976); Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628,
632 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rts. Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619, 620 (1973).
73. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762 (1977); Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495 (1976);
Jimenez v. Weinberger, 417 U.S. 628 (1974); New Jersey Welfare Rts. Org. v. Cahill, 411 U.S.
619 (1973); Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973); Weber v. Atena Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S.
164 (1972); Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971); Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins.
Co., 391 U.S. 73 (1968); Levy v. Lousiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968). Three other illegitimacy cases
were summarily affirmed by the Supreme Court during this period. Beaty v. Weinberger, 478
F.2d 300 (5th Cir. 1973), summarily a/Pd, 418 U.S. 901 (1974); Griffin v. Richardson, 346 F.
Supp. 1226 (Md.), summarily aff'd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972); Davis v. Richardson, 342 F. Supp.
588 (Conn.), summarily affd, 409 U.S. 1069 (1972).
74. 391 U.S. 68 (1968).
75. 391 U.S. 73 (1968).
76. Wallach and Tenoso, supra note 10.
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for the wrongful death of one in a familial relationship is not defini-
tively identified as a fundamental personal right, nor is illegitimacy
made a suspect classification. There is no discussion of the state's
interest in drawing a classificatory scheme basing recovery on legal
relationships rather than biological or economic ones. Douglas does
state that the status of illegitimacy has no relationship to the wrong-
ful death of the mother and, in Levy's brief concluding paragraph,
offers a constitutionally sufficient reason for striking down the dis-
criminatory provision. Since the ground is not clearly staked out,
however, the passage appears to be an afterthought rather than a
ratio decidendi: "[lit is invidious to discriminate against
[illegitimate children] when no action, conduct, or demeanor of
theirs is possibly relevant to the harm that was done their mother."8
This language alludes to the "principle which precludes a state from
denying persons rights on the basis of a condition over which they
have no control."'" Illegitimates are innocent of any wrongdoing so
the law should not burden them on the basis of their status at
birth.82
Perhaps: this principle was de-emphasized because in Glona,
the companion case to Levy, the party discriminated against was
the mother of an illegitimate. The valid state interests in promoting
marriages and discouraging promiscuity are furthered in statutes
which penalize the parents. The state's interest could fairly be as-
serted as not merely compensatory but "to compensate for loss to
the extent not inconsistent with the predominant interest in pro-
moting marriage and discouraging 'illegitimate' births." 3 Neverthe-
less, Justice Douglas asserts that "we see no possible rational basis
. . .for assuming that if the natural mother is allowed recovery for
the wrongful death of her illegitimate child, the cause of illegitimacy
will be served." 4 Despite the absence of the word "invidious" and
other more indicative language,it has been suggested that Glona, as
well as Levy, was decided on strict scrutiny grounds.8 5
The non-decisional language of Glona impedes understanding
of what the case stands for. It is unique in that it deals with discrim-
ination against a mother of an illegitimate. Thus it may be more
80. Id. at 72 (footnote omitted).
81. Gray and Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate, 118 U. PA, L. REv. 1,
9 (1969).
82. In Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660 (1962) the eighth and fourteenth amendments
were invoked against punishment for "narcotics addiction" which was found not to be a crime
but an "illness which may be contracted innocently or involuntarily." Id. at 667.
83. Wallach and Tenoso, supra note 10, at 44.
84. 391 U.S. 73, 75.
85. Wallach and Tenoso, supra note 10, at 44-45.
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proper to characterize Glona as dealing with a woman's right of
privacy in matters of child bearing and familial decisionmaking (as
in Roe v. Wade"5 ) rather than illegitimacy. 7
The dissenters " called Levy and Glona "constitutional curiosi-
ties." 9 The recovery scheme in the Louisiana wrongful death statute
is, after all, a "traditional pattern."9 Recovery based on legal family
relationships is just as rational, they assert, as awarding recovery on
the basis of biological, economic or emotional bonds.'
Commentators hailed the decisions, despite their analytical
deficiencies, as beginning an era of reform of the legal disabilities
burdening illegitimates. It was asserted that "Levy and Glona pro-
vide a basis from which all major legal disadvantages suffered by
reason of illegitimacy can be challenged successfully." 2 Contrary to
this position, some courts chose to restrict the decisions to relation-
ships involving illegitimate children and their mothers only. These
decisions thus perpetuated differential treatment in support 3 and
in paternal inheritance94 rights.
2. Labine
Labine v. Vincent"5 was the only illegitimacy case decided by
86. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
87. Other cases affirming freedom of personal choice in matters of marriage and family
life are: Cleveland v. Board of Educ. v. LaFleur, 414 U.S. 632 (1974); Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438 (1972); Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967); Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479 (1965); Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944); Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535
(1942); Pierce v. Society of Sisters, 268 U.S. 570 (1925); and Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S.
390 (1923).
88. J. Harlan with JJ. Black and Stewart.
89. Levy v. Louisiana and Glona v. American Guar. & Liab. Ins. Co., 391 U.S. 76 (1968)
(dissent).
90. Id. at 77.
91. Id. at 78-80.
92. Gray and Rudovsky, supra note 81, at 2.
93. Mitchell v. Mitchell, 445 F.2d 722 (D.C. Cir. 1971) (marital children entitled to
support in preference to illegitimate children); Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 335 F. Supp. 804
(N.D. Tex. 1971) (Texas support laws are not unconstitutional in excluding illegitimate
children.)
94. Sanders v. Tillman, 245 So. 2d 198 (Miss. 1971) (illegitimate child may not recover
for wrongful death of father where he had not legally acknowledged her during his lifetime);
Rogers v. State Farm Mut. Auto Ass'n, 261 So. 2d 320 (La. App. 1972) (denied wrongful death
action to illegitimate siblings, interpreting Levy and Glona as applicable to parent-child
relationship only); City of West Palm Beach v. Cowart, 241 So. 2d 748 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1970)
(father not allowed action for the wrongful death of his illegitimate child; Levy and Glona
restricted to maternal relationship only); George v. Bertrand, 243 La. 647, 217 So. 2d 47, writ
refused, 219 So. 2d 177 (1968), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 974 (1969) (legal husband of mother is
presumed to be the father of a child born in wedlock and father of illegitimate child may not
recover for the wrongful death of his son).
95. 401 U.S. 532 (1971).
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the transition Court"-the Court which followed the Warren Court"7
and preceded the fully-composed Burger Court.' To what extent
this explains its anomalous position in the ten year line of illegiti-
macy cases is only conjectural. The 4-1-4 Court upheld Louisiana's
intestacy law which permits duly acknowledged illegitimate chil-
dren to share in their father's intestate estate only where there is no
descendant, ascendant, collateral relation or wife."
The classification was tested on what appears to be a sub-
minimum scrutiny standard. Instead of attempting to suggest a
rational basis for distinguishing between duly acknowledged illegiti-
mates and legitimates, the Court intones:
[T]he power to make rules to. establish, protect and strengthen
family life as well as to regulate the disposition of property left
in Louisiana by a man dying there is committed by the Constitu-
tion of the United States and the people of Louisiana to the
legislature of that State. Absent a specific constitutional guaran-
tee, it is for the legislature, not the life-tenured judges of this
Court, to select from among possible laws . . . .[We cannot]
say that Louisiana does not have the power to make laws for
distribution of property left within the State.'®
The reaction of the dissent to this "reasoning" was less than
cordial. "[Tihe Court has not analyzed, or perhaps simply refuses
to analyze, Louisiana's discrimination against acknowledged illegi-
timates in terms of the requirements of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment." 0 1 Furthermore, the dissenters stated:
It is, to say the least, bewildering that a Court that for decades
has wrestled with the nuances of the concept of 'state action' in
96. JJ. Black, Blackmun, Stewart and C.J. Burger constituted the "majority" opinion
with J. Harlan concurring. JJ. Brennan, Douglas, Marshall and White dissented.
97. Levy and Glona, decided by the Warren Court, produced the following division: JJ.
Brennan, Douglas, Fortas, Marshall, White, and C.J. Warren, majority; JJ. Black, Harlan,
and Stewart, dissenting.
98. The Levy/Glona, Labine and Weber divisions appear thusly:
Levy/Glona
MAJ/DISS: Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, White, Fortas, Warren/Harlan,
Black, Stewart
Labine
DISS/CONC/MAJ: Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, White - -/ Harlan/Black,
Stewart, Burger, Blackmun
Weber
MAJ/CONC/DISS: Douglas, Brennan, Marshall, White, Powell - - - Stew-
art, Burger/Blackmun/Rehnquist.
99. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. art. 919 (1972).
100. Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538-39 (1971).
101. Id. at 551 (dissenting opinion).
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order to ascertain the reach of the Fourteenth Amendment, in
this case holds that the state action here, because it is state
action, is insulated from these restraints. 02
Four other points remain to be examined. Firstly, the majority
in Labine attempts to distinguish Levy by pointing out that the
latter case involved an insurmountable barrier to recovery (the ille-
gitimate children in Levy were totally barred from wrongful death
recovery) whereas the plaintiff in Labine could have shared in her
father's estate had he provided for her in his will. The dissent read-
ily dismisses this argument by noting that the "insurmountable"
barrier in Levy could have been overcome if the mother had ac-
knowledged her child. In Labine, even acknowledgement was insuf-
ficient to confer equal rights. 03 The dissent also refutes the second
implication that any discrimination which is less than insurmounta-
ble is permissible by resort to Levy. " The Court's most recent state-
ment on this question, in Trimble v. Gordon,'05 refers to it as an
"analytical anomaly."'00 Secondly, the State's interest argument,
alluded to in Harlan's dissent in Levy and Glona as to probative
problems in claims of illegitimates, is inapplicable to Labine where
the father had formally acknowledged his paternity. Thirdly, Har-
lan's concurring opinion suggests that the discrimination was rea-
sonable as reflecting the probable intent of a father to confer greater
rights on his marital children than on "the products of a casual
liaison."'' 7 The dissent refutes this contention by reminding Jus-
102. Id. at 549 (dissenting opinion).
103. Id. at 550 (dissenting opinion).
104. Id.
105. 430 U.S. 762, 773 (1977).
106. Id. at 773-74.
Despite its appearance in two of our opinions, the focus on the presence or
absence of an insurmountable barrier is somewhat of an analytical anomaly.
Here, as in Labine, the question is the constitutionality of a state intestate succes-
sion law that treats illegitimate children differently from legitimate children.
Traditional equal protection analysis asks whether this statutory differentiation
on the basis of illegitimacy is justified by the promotion of recognized state objec-
tives. If the law cannot be sustained on this analysis, it is not clear how it can be
saved by the absence of an insurmountable barrier to inheritance under other and
hypothetical circumstances.
By focusing on the steps that an intestate might have taken to assure some
inheritance for his illegitimate children, the analysis loses sight of the essential
question: the constitutionality of discrimination against illegitimates in a state
intestate succession law. If the decedent had written a will devising property to
his illegitimate child the case no longer would involve intestate succession law at
all. Similarly, if the decedent had legitimated the child by marrying the child's
mother or by complying with the requirements of some other method of legitima-
tion, the case no longer would involve discrimination against illegitimates. Hard
questions cannot be avoided by a hypothetical reshuffling of the facts.
107. 401 U.S. 532, 540 (concurring opinion).
[Vol. 32:339
EQUAL PROTECTION FOR ILLEGITIMATES
tice Harlan that this child was not the product of a casual liaison,
but lived for all of her six years with her father who had formally
acknowledged her and, thereby, had undertaken and discharged the
legal duty of her support. Finally, the dissenters repeat the due
process argument' mentioned in Levy010 by quoting from a state
supreme court decigion"0 which invalidated a similar discrimination
on the authority of Levy. Once again they invoke the term
"invidious." It thus would appear that they continued to espouse a
standard of strict scrutiny.
3. Weber
Having dealt with Louisiana's wrongful death and inheritance
statutes in Levy, Glona and Labine, the Court in Weber v. Aetna
Casualty & Surety Co."' next turned to Louisiana's workmen's
compensation scheme which gave a lower priority to the rights of
dependent, unacknowledged illegitimates than to legitimate and
acknowledged illegitimate children."' The Weber opinion"' is the
first "which attempts a reasoned explanation of its holding"", and
in so doing formulates a new test which balances the degree of
state interest against the fundamentality of the personal rights
involved. But, while the Court's discussion is by far the most in-
formative of all the illegitimacy opinions to date it is far from com-
prehensive."
Perhaps the greatest shortcoming in the Weber opinion is in its
attempt to distinguish Labine. Justice Powell first reiterates the
broad scope of state discretion"" in the regulation of inheritance. He
then recapitulates the two state interests which the Labine Court
put forward to distinguish that case from Levy: the importance of
a prompt and stable determination of land titles following death
and the insurmountable nature of the discrimination in Levy and
Weber, as opposed to Labine. Powell reminds us that in Labine the
father could have assured a legacy to his daughter by either marry-
ing her mother or leaving a will. The fallacy of this argument was
discussed earlier: the impediment to wrongful death recovery for the
108. 401 U.S. at 559; cf. text accompanying note 82 supra.
109. 391 U.S. at 72; see text accompanying note 70 supra.
110. In re Estate of Jensen, 162 N.W.2d 861 (N.D. 1968).
111. 406 U.S. 164 (1972).
112. LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23:1021(3), :1232(8) (West 1964).
113. See text accompanying notes 65 and 70 supra.
114. Note, Illegitimacy and Equal Protection, 49 N.Y.U.L. Rv. 479, 484 (1974).
115. Id. at 486.
116. 406 U.S. at 170.
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Levy plaintiff could have been eliminated by acknowledgement.
The question of insurmountability thus can not be determinative., 7
Nevertheless, Powell equated the insurmountabilities of Levy and
Weber, where a statute prohibited acknowledgement of illegiti-
mates when the parents were incapable of marriage at the time of
conception, and used this similarity to distinguish Labine. "'
The inability of the Weber Court to identify a fundamental
right which would permit it to distinguish the Labine minimum
rationality test from the one which it may embody (strict scru-
tiny) "' and the one which it espouses (a middle-level balancing test)
and the one which it probably covertly applies (the Reed test) has
left Justice Rehnquist 20 and commentators 2' in a quandary. If the
fundamental personal right which the classification may endanger
is the right of a child to a relationship with his father, including the
normal concomitants of care and support, Labine is indistin-
guishable. 22 The fundamental personal right could surely not be a
child's right to statutorily created workmen's compensation bene-
fits.'23 These statutes were created relatively recently, afford exclu-
sive remedies, and are in derogation of the common law. By preserv-
ing Labine, the Court in Weber stopped short of labeling illegiti-
macy a suspect classification, though perhaps this would have been
the more candid course.
4. Gomez AND Cahill
Though Gomez v. PerezU follows Weber in time, it conspicu-
ously fails to follow Weber's analytic formula or even to mention
state interest. Gomez has perhaps the greatest potential application
of all the illegitimacy cases in that it directly involved the illegiti-
mate child's right to support. The appropriate holding could have
a far greater impact on equalizing the economic life of the illegiti-
mate child than could decisions involving inheritance, workmen's
compensation and wrongful death actions. Perhaps a consideration
of this impact prompted the Court to forego analysis in favor of
conclusory language.
Texas gave no right of support to illegitimates and provided no
117. See text accompanying note 70 supra.
118. LA. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 204 (West 1952).
119. See text accompanying notes 70-72 supra.
120. 406 U.S. 164, 183 (1972).
121. E.g., Note, A Decision on Illegitimacy, 34 U. Pimt. L. REv. 472, 483 (1973).
122. Id.
123. Id. at 483-84.
124. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
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mechanism for establishing paternity other than voluntary ac-
knowledgement. '25 Labine is not mentioned; Levy and Weber are
interpreted as holding that "a State may not invidiously discrimi-
nate against illegitimate children by denying them substantial ben-
efits accorded children generally."'' 6 To deny substantial benefits is
thus "invidious" discrimination. Presumably the only statute deny-
ing rights to illegitimates which would be permissible under this
principle is one that granted only insubstantial benefits. This lan-
guage and the precise formulation of the holding go far beyond the
facts of the case:
We therefore hold that once a State posits a judicially enforceable
right on behalf of children to needed support from their natural
fathers there is no constitutionally sufficient justification for de-
nying such an essential right to a child simply because its natural
father has not married its natural mother. For a State to do so is
'illogical and unjust." 7
The denial could be "illogical and unjust" for two reasons. First,
legitimate and illegitimate children are similarly situated in their
dependency needs. Thus a non-support statute which excludes
them is under-inclusive. Or, secondly, due process does not permit
their deprivation as a result of their parents' having created them
extramaritally and then failing to marry. If the former reasoning is
intended, the application of the case could be restricted to support
provisions. But it is arguable that this language mandates equal,
identical treatment for legitimates and illegitimates in both the
duration and amount of support. If the second interpretation was
intended, we cannot but conclude that no differential treatment of
illegitimates is permissible. In this sense, they would become a sus-
pect class.
In the interim between Gomez and the Supreme Court's next
decision, New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill,"2 the
Kentucky Supreme Court, in Pendleton v. Pendleton,'9 denied pa-
ternal inheritance to the child of a common law marriage. The mar-
riage was valid in the state of the child's birth. The family moved
to Kentucky, and the father died there. Kentucky does not recog-
nize common law marriages. The court followed Labine (dealing, as
125. Texas now has a paternity statute which, except for its one year statute of limita-
tions, is one of the most progressive in the country. See TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2 § 13.01-
09 (Vernon Supp. 1976).
126. 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
127. Id. (citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
128. 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
129. 531 S.W.2d 507 (Ky. 1975).
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it does, with both inheritance and illegitimacy). Justice Palmore,
writing for a unanimous court, laments the Levy-Gomez line of
precedents. Particularly he finds fault with the continued vitality
of Labine resulting from Weber's superficial distinctions and
Gomez's total failure to deal with it. His dilemma is expressed elo-
quently and since it is shared by many, it is set forth in the mar-
gin.13 0
The decision in New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v.
Cahill"' followed closely after Gomez in time and method. New
Jersey's "Assistance to Families of the Working Poor"'31 program
limited benefits to those otherwise qualified families "which consist
of a household composed of two adults of the opposite sex ceremoni-
ally married to each other who have at least one minor child under
the age of 18 residing with them, who shall be either the natural
child of both, the natural child of one adopted by the other, or a
child adopted by both.''3 3 The Court found therein a violation of
equal protection.
The statute differs from those in prior cases in the clear expres-
sion of its purpose: to assist the poor only insofar as consistent with
the state's interest in promoting "legitimate" families. The Court
130. It is readily apparent that the meaning of the equal protection clause
cannot be ascertained from what it says, nor even from what the Supreme Court
has said about it.
. . . Since it is now held by the court of last resort in the federal constitu-
tional field that a child's right of support from its father is within the coverage of
the equal protection clause and, if accorded to legitimate children in general,
must be accorded to illegitimate children as well, it would be our inclination to
hold that although a right of inheritance may not have the immediacy or social
significance of a present need for support, yet a right is a right, the existence of
which surely ought not to depend on whether it falls within the ambit of state-
enforced welfare legislation. If a state cannot constitutionally force a father to
support his children without including illegitimate children, we can find no justi-
fication in logic for its authority to deny illegitimate children the same right of
inheritance conferred upon other children. Though the right has something of a
fugitive nature in that the father may of course discriminate against any child,
legitimate or illegitimate, it seems incongruous that the state should be allowed
to do it for him. But after all, this is mere logic, which seems to have a declining
importance in the world of constitutional jurisprudence.
We are equipped with neither a crystal ball nor the type of scales on which
it is evident that a right must be weighed in order to determine whether it is heavy
enough to register under the 14th Amendment. Nor are we willing to undertake
the sophistry of distinguishing Labine v. Vincent .. . . Suffice it to say that it
has not been overruled by the court that has the exclusive power to overrule it
and we think that as long as it remains the law it governs this case.
!d. at 510-11.
131. 411 U.S. 619 (1973).
132. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:13-.to -13 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
133. N.J. STAT. ANN. § 44:13-3(a) (West Supp. 1977-1978).
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could not infer a solely compensatory purpose which would be unre-
lated to the denial of rights to illegitimates. Thus a strict means-
analysis (does the classification reasonably effectuate the purpose
of the statute) would result in upholding the provision. The receipt
of welfare assistance could not be considered a fundamental per-
sonal right. The dicta in Weber about a due process doctrine"4 and
the Gomez argument that illegitimates are similarly situated in
their needs for support'35 constitute the "analysis" in Cahill.
The argument that a burden must bear a relationship to re-
sponsibility or wrongdoing is somewhat strained here. The discrimi-
natory classification is the non-marital family unit which includes
one or two responsible parties in addition to the innocent child,
albeit less money to the mother spells less money for the child. It is
clear that something more than the articulated rationale is present
in the decision, otherwise all discrimination would be permissible
in other circumstances against mothers and fathers of illegitimates.
Glona held otherwise. The opinion thus may be read widely to mean
that the State may not discriminate against illegitimate families.
This conclusion had to remain unspoken because it would result in
two further conclusions: the State's interest in promoting marriage
is not a legitimate one and illegitimacy is an unacceptable classifi-
cation even as applied to the responsible parties. The Court was
clearly trying to draw a line short of the strict scrutiny standard.
5. Jimenez AND Lucas
The plaintiffs in Jimenez v. Weinberger3 and in Mathews v.
Lucas'37 were outside the scope of the Social Security Act's pre-
sumption of dependency provisions. 38 The Jimenez children, born
134. "[Imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept
of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility
or wrongdoing . . . .[Weber] 406 U.S. 164, 175." 411 U.S. 619, 620.
135. "[TIhere can be no doubt that the benefits extended under the challenged program
are as indispensable to the .health and well being of illegitimate children as to those who are
legitimate." Id. at 621.
136. 417 U.S. 628 (1974).
137. 427 U.S. 495 (1976).
138. The presumptions of dependency are found in 42 U.S.C. § 402(d)(3) (1970). Section
402(d)(1) provides that "[elvery child (as defined in section 416(e) of this title) of an individ-
ual entitled to ...disability insurance benefits or of an individual who dies a fully or
currently insured individual, if such child" has filed an application, is unmarried and under
18, or 22 if a full-time student, and was dependent upon such individual, is entitled to benefits
on account of the insured individual's disability or death.
A child under § 416(e) includes a step-child and a legally adopted child. Section
416(h)(2)(A) adds that any child who, by state intestacy law, would be entitled to inherit from
the insured individual would also be deemed his-child. Section 416(h)(2)(B) adds children
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after the onset of their father's disability, were statutorily denied
benefits arising from that disability 3 ' because, not falling under the
statutory presumptions of dependency, 1" 0 they had to prove actual
who would have been legitimate except for a non-obvious defect in the parents' marriage.
Under § 402(d)(3) certain children are presumed dependent and need not offer proof of
that fact for entitlement:
(3) A child shall be deemed dependent upon his father . . . at such time, such
individual was not living with or contributing to the support of such child and-
(A) such child is neither the legitimate nor adopted child of such individual,
or
(B) such child has been adopted by some other individual.
For purposes of this paragraph, a child deemed to be a child of a fully or currently
insured individual pursuant to section 416(h)(2)(B) or section 416(h)(3) of this
title shall be deemed to be the legitimate child of such individual.
(4) A child shall be deemed dependent upon his stepfather or a stepmother ....
Section 416(h)(3) enumerates the "final" circumstances under which a child can be deemed
legitimate in order to be eligible for benefits despite the absence of presumed dependency. It
is subsection (3)(B) and (3)(C) of § 416(h) which are involved in Jimenez and Lucas, respec-
tively. The subsections are set forth below:
(3) An applicant who is the son or daughter of a fully or currently insured individ-
ual, but who is not (and is not deemed to be) the child of such insured individual
under paragraph (2) of this subsection, shall nevertheless be deemed to be the
child of such insured individual if:
(B) in the case of an insured individual entitled to disability insurance benefits
(i) such insured individual-
(I) has acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son or daughter,
(I1) has been decreed by a court to be the father of the applicant, or
(III) has been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the
applicant because the applicant is his son or daughter, and such acknowledge-
ment, court decree, or court order was made before such insured individual's most
recent period of disability began; or
(ii) such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the Secretary
to be the father of the applicant and was living with or contributing to the support
of that applicant at the time such period of disability began;
(C) in the case of a deceased individual-
(i) such insured individual-
(I) had acknowledged in writing that the applicant is his son or daughter,
(II) had been decreed by a court to be the father of the applicant, or
(III) had been ordered by a court to contribute to the support of the
applicant because the applicant was his son or daughter, and such acknowledg-
ment, court decree, or court order was made before the death of such insured
individual, or
(ii) such insured individual is shown by evidence satisfactory to the Secretary
to have been the father of the applicant, and such insured individual was living
with or contributing to the support of the applicant at the time such insured
individual died.
(emphasis added). The underlined portions were the last barriers which prevented the Jime-
nez and Lucas children from recovering. Subsection (3)(B) was held invalid; subsection
(3)(C) was held valid.
139. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970).
140. See note 138 supra.
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acknowledgement and dependency prior to the onset of their fa-
ther's disability.' Since they were born two and five years after the
disability commenced they could not demonstrate the requisite de-
pendency.
The Lucas children were statutorily denied benefits sought as
a result of their father's death' because, not falling under the statu-
tory presumptions of dependency,' they had to prove that their
father was either living with them or contributing to their support
at the time of his death.' Since the father did neither, they were
precluded from receiving benefits under the statute.
Section 216(h)(3)(B) was found to violate Fifth Amendment
equal protection in Jimenez; section 216(h)(3)(C) was held valid in
Lucas. The reason for the disparate results is simply this: the statu-
tory purpose put forth by the government in Jimenez was "to pro-
vide support for dependents of a disabled wage earner.""'4 Whereas
the statutory purpose proclaimed by the government in Lucas was
"to replace the support lost by a child when his father . . . dies."'"
Using a "means-analysis"' 47 approach, examining whether the
legislative means substantially further legislative ends,'" the
Jimenez Court concluded that since all dependents of the disabled
wage earner were within the purview of the Social Security Act, the
provisions were under-inclusive. The Jimenez children were ac-
tually dependent on their father but were not included. Conversely,
many children, legitimate, legitimated and otherwise presumed
dependent, could obtain payments without resort to proof of
dependency-in-fact prior to the onset of the disability (including
after-born illegitimates like the plaintiffs) though they were not
actually dependent on him.
Since the Lucas Court accepted the government's characteriza-
tion of statutory purpose as compensating for support lost, and the
Lucas children were not in fact receiving support at the time of their
father's death, they are not intended beneficiaries of the Act.
In both cases the Court took pains to explain the methods
which they had applied: examining the relationship between statu-
141. See note 138 supra, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(B).
142. 42 U.S.C. § 402(d) (1970).
143. See note 138 supra.
144. See note 138 supra, 42 U.S.C. § 416(h)(3)(C).
145. 417 U.S. at 634.
146. 427 U.S. at 507.
147. See, Gunther, The Supreme Court 1971 Term-Forward: In Search of Evolving
Doctrine on a Changing Court: A Model for a Newer Equal Protection, 86 HARv. L. REv. 1
(1972).
148. Id. at 20.
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tory purpose and the classifications chosen to effectuate that pur-
pose. The approach is superficially viable but it has two great draw-
backs. First, if the Court continues to defer to the governmental
characterization of statutory purpose, the government can assert
any rationale which will assure that the statute is not under-
inclusive. Secondly, this approach emphasizes the proper drawing
of statutes and de-emphasizes constitutional safeguards inherent in
the concept of equal protection.
For example, a state may define the purpose of the support
provision of its paternity statute as being to shift the burden of
support from the state to the father whose moral and legal obliga-
tion it is to support his children. This purpose is served by a provi-
sion which imposes a duty on the father to pay an amount of support
which will insure survival and no more. Under a strict means-
analysis approach, we would not ask if the articulated purpose were
"legitimate;""14 nor would we ask if there is an underlying rationale
for granting illegitimates a right to a lesser amount of support than
is due legitimate children whose parents are divorced. The latter
would be entitled to support which takes into account the father's
ability to pay as well as the child's needs.
The Jimenez Court was not slavish in following the govern-
ment's assertions of purpose, however, since it noted that the gov-
ernment's secondary purpose, to prevent spurious claims, was not
effectuated by the classifications. The possibility of fraudulent
claims was just as great with other afterborn illegitimates who en-
joyed the presumption of dependency.
The Lucas opinion is notable also for its explicit refusal to add
illegitimacy to the brief list of suspect classifications.5" The Court
compares the burdens of the illegitimates with those of women and
blacks and finds them much lighter.''
One further aspect of the Jimenez opinion remains to be dis-
cussed: "[T]he opinion has strong due process overtones . . . at
times appearing to pay homage to the still novel, and I think unsup-
portable theory that 'irrebuttable presumptions' violate due pro-
cess."1 52
149. Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173 (1972).
150. See text accompanying notes 32-41 supra.
151. [Pjerhaps in part because the roots of the discrimination rest in the
conduct of the parents rather than the child, and perhaps in part because illegiti-
macy does not carry an obvious badge, as race or sex do, this discrimination
against illegitimates has never approached the severity or pervasiveness of the
historic legal and political discrimination against women and Negroes.
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. at 506 (footnotes and citations omitted).
152. 417 U.S. at 638 (Rehnquist, J., dissenting).
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Justice Rehnquist points to the language of the majority opin-
ion to the effect that if the children were dependent, "it would not
serve the purpose of the Act to conclusively deny them an opportun-
ity to establish their dependency and their right to insurance bene-
fits."'53 When a statute deprives an individual of liberty or property
by presuming that person to be a member of a particular class,
without giving him the opportunity to refute his status as a member
of that class the irrebuttable presumption doctrine has been in-
voked.5 4 This presumption was present in the analysis in Stanley
v. Illinois'55 although that case was decided on equal protection
grounds. 8 Vlandis v. Kline"5 7 was the first recent case to espouse the
doctrine as its holding.' 8 In that case, a Connecticut student was
precluded from proving a later-acquired residency because of a pre-
sumption that his legal address would continue to be his permanent
address during his enrollment at the university. As a result, the
student was required to pay higher tuition rates than in-state stu-
dents. The policy of the differential treatment in Vlandis was un-
doubtedly to subsidize higher education for state residents to the
degree possible within the finite amount allocated. Under the
Dandridge v. Williams rationale,'59 some discrimination is permissi-
ble when resources are limited. The purpose of aiding bona fide
residents (whose parents are probably taxpayers of Connecticut)
would be defeated if every out-of-state student could claim resi-
153. Id. at 639 (emphasis added).
154. 10 NEW ENG. L. REV. 561, 566-67 (1974).
155. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
[I]t may be argued that unmarried fathers are so seldom fit that Illinois need
not undergo the administrative inconvenience of inquiry in any case, including
Stanley's. The establishment of prompt efficacious procedures to achieve legiti-
mate state ends is a proper state interest worthy of cognizance in constitutional
adjudication. But the Constitution recognizes higher values than speed and effi-
ciency. Indeed, one might fairly say of the Bill of Rights in general, and the Due
Process Clause in particular, that they were designed to protect the fragile values
of a vulnerable citizenry from the overbearing concern for efficiency and efficacy
that may characterize praiseworthy governmental officials no less, and perhaps
more, than mediocre ones. Procedure by presumption is always cheaper and easier
than individualized determination. But when, as here, the procedure forecloses
the determinative issues of competence and care, when it explicitly disdains
present realities in deference to past formalities, it needlessly risks running rough-
shod over the important interests of both parent and child. It therefore cannot
itand.
Id. at 656-57 (footnotes omitted).
156. Id.
157. 412 U.S. 441 (1973).
158. 10 NEW ENG. L. REV. 561, 567 (1974).
159. 397 U.S. 471 (1970) (Court upheld ceiling on benefits to AFDC families which gave
maximum assistance to a family with five children and no more where there were six or more
children).
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dency upon arrival and thereby require Connecticut to subsidize all
students. Nevertheless, the irrebuttable presumption was found to
violate due process guarantees.
The principle argument against the extension, or even contin-
ued application, of the irrebuttable presumption doctrine is that a
case-by-case determination for every individual in every class drawn
by legislatures would pose an intolerable financial and administra-
tive burden.'""
6. Trimble v. Gordon
Trimble v. Gordon"' arose under the Illinois Probate Act'02
which provided for intestate inheritance by legitimate children from
both parents, but by illegitimate children only from the mother.0 3
In finding a violation of equal protection in this differential treat-
ment, the Court stopped short of overruling Labine on its facts, but
160. For example, probably every state has a statute prohibiting marriage below a cer-
tain age. The state might propound three reasons to justify such a provision: first, its inter-
est in protecting minors from the life-long consequences of a decision made when immature;
second, to encourage more or less permanent unions which create a stable family environ-
ment; third, to assure that the partners are capable of self-sustenance. The incidence of
divorce increases inversely with the age of newlyweds. The state therefore presumes irrebutta-
bly that most people attain sufficient maturity by the age of 18, for example, to make a
reasoned choice of partner and to be capable of supporting themselves.
Statutes make exceptions to the minimum age limit, for example, when the woman is
pregnant or delivered a child and when the couple has parental consent.
Were a future court to find that the freedom to marry is a fundamental personal right,
analogizing from Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1 (1967), then the irrebuttable presumption of
maturity at age 18 could not stand. Adolescents who desired to marry would be permitted to
demonstrate the wisdom of their decision and their ability to support the family unit.
Another example which demonstrates the preposterous consequences of this doctrine
concerns the minimum age for being licensed to drive motor vehicles. In most states 16 is
irrebuttably presumed to be the minimum age at which one acquires sufficient maturity and
competence to drive. The so-called "privilege" to be licensed to drive could conceivably reach
the status of a "right," linked to freedom of interstate travel, following Shapiro v. Thompson,
394 U.S. 618 (1969). What 15-year old would not seek an administrative determination that
he is sufficiently skilled and mature to be licensed? If he failed the first time, would he not
have the right to try again every two weeks?
161. 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977).
162. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (Smith-Hurd 1961). Effective January 1, 1976, § 12 and
the rest of the Probate Act of which it was a part were repealed and replaced by the Probate
Act of 1975. Public Act 79-328. Section 12 has been replaced by ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 2-2
(Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977). That section was recodified without material change.
163. An illegitimate child is heir of its mother and of any maternal ancester,
and of any person from whom its mother might have inherited, if living; and the
lawful issue of an illegitimate person shall represent such person and take, by
descent, any estate which the parent would have taken, if living. An illegitimate
child whose parents inter-marry and who is acknowledged by the father as the
father's child shall be considered legitimate.
ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 3, § 12 (Smith-Hurd 1961).
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it did overrule the Labine standard of scrutiny as applied to state
intestacy laws." 4
The opinion is the most refined and articulate in the entire line
of illegitimacy cases. It adequately details the analytic framework
employed by the Court and leads us through the examination.
While clarifying the predominant role of the Reed test' in future
equal protection cases, it preserves alternative doctrines 6 and defi-
nitively rejects one as inappropriate.' 7
While the opinion falls short of calling illegitimacy a suspect
category, something it is clearly loathe to do, it implies that the
scrutiny which will be applied to illegitimacy is almost indistin-
164. The Illinois statute can be distinguished in several respects from the
Louisiana statute in Labine. The discrimination in Labine took a different form,
suggesting different legislative objectives . . . .In its impact on the illegitimate
children excluded from their parents' estates, the statute was significantly dif-
ferent. Under Louisiana law, all illegitimate children, "natural" and "bastard,"
were entitled to support from the estate of the deceased parent . . . .Despite
these differences, it is apparent that we have examined the Illinois statute more
critically than the Court examined the Louisiana statute in Labine. To the extent
that our analysis in this differs from that in Labine the more recent analysis
controls.
(emphasis added) 97 S. Ct. at 1468 n.17.
165. See text accompanying notes 52-60 supra.
166. Due process-punish not the innocent:
The status of illegitimacy has expressed through the ages society's condemnation
of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of marriage. But visiting this condem-
nation on the head of an infant is illogical and unjust. Moreover, imposing disabil-
ities on the illegitimate child is contrary to the basic concept of our system that
legal burdens should bear some relationship to individual responsibility or wrong-
doing. Obviously, no child is responsible for his birth and penalizing the illegiti-
mate child is an ineffectual-as well as an unjust-way of deterring the parent."
406 U.S. at 175 (footnote omitted).
97 S. Ct. 1465 (1977) (quoting Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972)).
Due process-irrebuttable presumptions:
The more serious problems of proving paternity might justify a more demanding
standard for illegitimate children claiming under their fathers' estates than that
required either for illegitimate children claiming under their mothers' estates or
for legitimate children generally. We think, however, that the Illinois Supreme
Court gave inadequate consideration to the relation between § 12 and the State's
proper objective of assuring accuracy and efficiency in the disposition of property
at death. The court failed to consider the possibility of a middle ground between
the extremes of complete exclusion and case-by-case determination of paternity.
For at least some significant categories of illegitimate children of intestate men,
inheritance rights can be recognized without jeopardizing the orderly settlement
of estates or the dependability of titles to property passing under intestacy laws.
Because it excludes those categories of illegitimate children unnecessarily, § 12
is constitutionally flawed.
Id. at 1465.
167. The "insurmountable barrier" distinction, mentioned in Labine and Weber is re-
jected as an "analytic anomoly." Id. at 1467. See text accompanying notes 104-06 & note 106
supra.
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guishable from strict scrutiny. A scheme which discriminates
against illegitimates will be tolerated only where the statute is
"carefully tuned to alternative considerations."' 65 Where the child
can demonstrate paternity through an adjudication or a written
acknowledgement, the state may not deny his right to an intestate
share.
This means that the courts will take a more activist role in
finding equal protection violations. In the narrow gap between this
standard and strict scrutiny, however, state legislatures will find
space to rest comfortably with current legislation. There will be no
legal compulsion to put illegitimates on a parity with legitimate
children; the effect of moral compulsion on the legislatures has been
lamentable. As long as state legislatures can carefully frame their
state purpose for denying full equality, they will be able to discrimi-
nate with impunity.
IV. DEFECTS IN CHAPTER 742, FLORIDA STATUTES AND COMPARISON
WITH OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Only six states' have not enacted a statutory procedure for the
determination of paternity, but even these have non-support legisla-




Florida provides that "[any unmarried woman who shall be
pregnant or delivered of a child may bring [paternity] proceed-
ings."7 ' The Supreme Court of Florida judicially excised the word
"unmarried" from this provision in 1976, finding such classification
an "unreasonable and invidious discrimination.""'7 The court based
the finding of a denial of equal protection on two grounds. First, the
state's interest in protecting a child from being publicly bastardized
by its married mother was found less significant than that child's
right to support, regardless of the marital status of the mother.
168. Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U.S. 495, 513 (1976).
169. Alaska, Louisiana, Missouri, Pennsylvania, South Carolina and Virginia.
170. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.35.010, .100 (1975 & Supp. 1976); LA. CIv. CODE ANN. arts. 240,
245 (West 1952 & Supp. 1977); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 559.353 (Vernon Supp. 1977); PA. STAT. ANN.
tit. 18, § 4323 (Purdon 1973); S.C. CODE § 20-7-40 (1976); VA. CODE §§ 20-61.1 (1975 & Supp.
1977).
171. FLA. STAT. § 742.011 (1975).
172. Gammon v. Cobb, 335 So. 2d 261, 267 (1976).
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Secondly, many similarly situated (i.e., adulterine) bastards in
Florida are given support rights or other substantial benefits under
conflicting provisions of Florida law.
2. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
The statutes of several other jurisdictions permit the mother to
maintain the paternity action only if she is unmarried,' although
two relax the rule.'75 In the remaining statutes, the mother can bring
the suit regardless of her marital status.' If the mother is dead or
disabled suit may be brought by her personal representative.'" Only
eight states allow the putative father to initiate a paternity suit'
and two extend this right to his personal representative after his
death.' Less than half the states give the right to sue to the child
174. ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 1/4, § 54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1977); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 38-
1101 (1973); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.01 (Page Supp. 1976); OKLA. REV. CODE ANN. tit.
10, § 71 (West Supp. 1976); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.125 (1974) (mother of a child born out of
wedlock or female pregnant with a child who may be born out of wedlock); VT. STAT. ANN.
tit. 15 § 331 (1974) (single); WIS. STAT. ANN. §§ 52.23-.25 (West Supp. 1976-1977).
175. D.C. CODE § 16-2342 (1973) (unmarried to the putative father); W. VA. CODE § 48-
7-1 (1976) (unmarried woman or woman who has not cohabited with her husband for one year
or longer).
176. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 12(1) (Supp. 1973); ARiz. REv. STAT. § 12-843 (Supp. 1976-1977);
ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-702 (1962); CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006 (West Supp. 1977); COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 19-6-101 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-435a (Supp. 1977); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1321
(1974); HAw. REV. STAT. § 584-6 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 7-1110 (Supp. 1977); IND. CODE
§ 31-4-1-9 (1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.021 (Baldwin 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit.
19, § 272 (Supp. 1976-1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66B (1973); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §
722.714.4(a), (h) (Supp. 1977-1978); MINN. STAT ANN. § 257.253 (West Supp. 1977); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 93-9-9 (1972); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-307 (Supp. 1975); NEB. REV. STAT.
§ 13-106 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.090 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-A:2 (Supp.
1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-2 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-4-8 (Supp. 1975); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 522 (McKinney Supp. 1976-1977); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-16 (1976); N.D. CENT.
CODE § 14-17-05 (Supp. 1975) (UPA); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-1 (Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED
LAWS ANN. § 25-8-10 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-224 (1977); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03
(Vernon Supp. 1976) (not explicit but can be inferred); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060
(Supp. 1976); Wvo. STAT. § 14-59.7 (Interim Supp. 1977).
177. IND. CODE § 31-4-1-9 (1976) (mother or if dead or disabled, her legal representative
or her guardian or next friend); MONT. REv. CODES ANN. § 61-307 (Supp. 1975) (modifies
UPA: "any interested party may bring" though subsection 6(a) omitted); N.C. GEN. STAT. §
49-16 (1976); N.D.'CENT. CODE § 14-17-05 (Supp. 1975) (uniform version, UPA); OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 3111.02 (Page Supp. 1960); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-224 (1977); WASH. REV. CODE
ANN. § 26.26.060 (Supp. 1976) (uniform version, UPA).
178. Aaiz. REV. STAT. § 12-843 (Supp. 1976-1977); CAL. CIv. CODE § 7006 (West Supp.
1977); HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-6 (Supp. 1975); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.714(4)(a) (Supp.
1977-1978); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-307 (Supp. 1975) (modified UPA); N.M. STAT. ANN.
§ 22-4-3 (Supp. 1975)(either parent may sue for equal share of support furnished or owed);
N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 522 (McKinney Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-16; N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 14-17-05 (Supp. 1975)(UPA); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.125 (1975); TEx. F m. CODE ANN. § 11.03
(Vernon Supp. 1976)(not stated but can be inferred); WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060
(Supp. 1976)(uniform version, UPA).
179. California, Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota and Washington. See note 178 supra.
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through a guardian or best friend80 and several permit his suit only
in the event of his mother's death or disability."' Next of kin"8 2 and
other persons having legal custody' 3 are added in a few statutes.
Most recent amendments have given standing to welfare authorities
to initiate a paternity action.8 4 Some amendments, however, explic-
itly restrict the welfare authorities' right to sue to situations where
the mother fails to bring suit,' 5 the agency is contributing to the
support of the mother or child in whole or part,' or the mother'7
or child' or both'8 are likely to become a public charge. In two
180. ARIz. REV. STAT. § 12-843 (Supp. 1976-1977); CAL. CIv. CODE § 7006 (West Supp.
1977); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-101 (1973) (child's gaurdian of the person); HAW. REV. STAT.
§ 584-6 (Supp. 1975); IDAHO CODE § 7-110 (Supp. 1976); IND. CODE § 31-4-1-9 (1976); Ky. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 406.021 (Baldwin 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 272 (Supp. 1976-1977);
MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.253 (West Supp. 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-9 (1972)(UAP);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-307 (Supp. 1975)(modified version, UPA); NEB. REV. STAT. §
13-106 (1974); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.090 (1973); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-A:2 (Supp.
1973)(UAP); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-4-8 (Supp. 1975)(child may sue through guardian or next
friend after death or disability of parent); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 522 (McKinney Supp. 1976);
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-16 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-05 (Supp. 1975)(UPA); OR. REV.
STAT. § 109.125 (1975); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-8-10 (1976); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
11.03 (Vernon Supp. 1976); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060 (Supp. 1976)(UPA); Wyo.
STAT. § 14-59.7 (Interim Supp. 1977).
181. Indiana, Nevada, New Mexico, South Dakota and Wyoming. See statutory sections
in note 180 supra.
182. IDAHO CODE § 7-1110 (Supp. 1976) and N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 522 (McKinney Supp.
1976).
183. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 12(1) (Supp. 1973); IDAHO CODE § 7-1110 (Supp. 1976); N.Y.
FAM. CT. ACT § 522 (McKinney Supp. 1976).
184. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 12-843 (Supp. 1976-1977); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-440a (West
Supp. 1977)(state or town interested in the support of the illegitimate child if mother fails to
bring the action); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 1/4, § 54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); Ky. REv. STAT.
ANN. § 406.021 (Baldwin 1976)(person or agency substantially contributing to support); ME.
REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 272 (Supp. 1976-1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66C (Supp. 1976);
MIH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.714(h) (Supp. 1977-1978)(if supported in whole or part by
public assistance); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.253 (West Supp. 1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-
9 (1972)(UAP); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 168-A:2 (1973) (UAP); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-2 (West
1976)(but not as a condition precedent to state relief); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-16 (1976); OHIO
REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.03 (Page 1960); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.125 (1975)(state agency support-
ing mother or child and support enforcement division); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-1 (Supp.
1976)(local director of welfare or state department); TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 11.03 (Vernon
Supp. 1976); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 331 (1974), § 373 (Supp. 1977); WASH. REV. CODE ANN.
§ 26.26.060 (Supp. 1976)(UPA).
.' 185. Connecticut, see note 184 supra; Vermont, VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 373 (Supp.
1977)(if mother does not charge a person with being its father within 30 days after the child
is born, the commissioner of social welfare may make a complaint).
186. Illinois, Kentucky, Michigan and Oregon. See note 184 supra.
187. CoLo. REV. STAT. § 19-6-101 (1973).
188. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 12(1) (Supp. 1973); NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-106 (1974); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 126.090 (1973); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 9:17-2 (West 1976); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-4-8
(Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-05 (Supp. 1975) (UPA); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. §
25-8-10 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-224 (1977).
189. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 522 (McKinney Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-16 (1976).
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states the district attorney90 has standing. Delaware,' 9 ' Washing-
ton, '9 and all the states which have enacted the Uniform Act of
Paternity (UAP) 93 and those which have enacted its successor, the
Uniform Parentage Act (UPA),' 9 ' (in some cases where there is a
"presumed"'' 5 father) permit any interested person to bring an ac-
tion.
3. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
The UPA was approved by the National Conference of Commis-
sioners on Uniform State Laws in 1973. The substantive portion of
the Act, defining the parent and child relationship and extending
it to every child and every parent regardless of legal status, com-
prises the first two sections. Presumptions of paternity from state
statutes are compiled in section 4(a). Where one or more circum-
stances obtain, formal proceedings to establish paterntiy are not
necessary. The enumerated presumptions of section 4(a) are rebutt-
able by "clear and convincing evidence.""' Section 6 lists persons
with standing to bring a paternity action. 97 The section is designed
to give presumed biological family members the fullest opportunity
to be accorded the rights and duties of a legal family relationship
where the parents have at least attempted marriage before or after
the child's birth. In that event, only the parents and child would be
interested in an adjudication of the existence of the father and child
relationship, and they may seek it at any time." '
Where there has been no attempted marriage the presumption
of paternity is slightly weaker. In this case the presumption arises
from the presumed father's openly acknowledging the child by ac-
cepting him into his home and holding him out to be his child, or
by a formal, filed acknowledgement."' It would be rare for one other
than the child's true father to perform these acts. However, if he
did, he could not defeat the rights of the father who as an
190. CAL. CIV. CODE § 7006 (West Supp. 1977); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-4-8 (Supp. 1975);
Wis. STAT. ANN. § 52.23-.25 (West Supp. 1976-1977).
191. DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 1321 (1974).
192. WASH. REv. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060 (Supp. 1976)(UPA).
193. Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.021 (Baldwin 1976); ME. REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 272
(Supp. 1976-1977); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-9 (1972); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. § 168-a:2 (1973);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-45a-2 (Supp. 1975).
194. California, Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota, Washington and Wyoming. For the
list of statutory sections, see note 180 supra.
195. Section 4, UPA. See test accompanying notes 196-201 infra.
196. UPA § 4(b).
197. UPA § 6(a)-(c).
198. UPA § 6(a).
199. UPA § 4(a)(3)-(5).
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"interested party" could initiate proceedings at any time.""
Where the child has no presumed father under the provisions
of section 4, an action can be brought by the child, his mother, or
his personal representative, the personal representative or parent of
his mother if she is dead, a man alleging himself to be the father,
or his parent or personal representative if he is a minor or dead.20'
By enumerating possible plaintiffs, the section has precluded an
interpretation that any of the parties listed are not "interested."
The individuals named are those most likely to have an interest in
the welfare of the child. It is very difficult to conceive of a situation
in which no party is able to assert rights for the child as, even after
his death, his personal representative may enforce his rights for the
benefits of his heirs.
The state's interest is not forgotten. The appropriate state
agency can sue where there is no presumed father.0 2 There is no
doubt but that a state is an interested party when it is, or may be,
required to support the child in place of the father. Assuming he is
capable, it is the father's duty (not the state's) to support and
maintain his children irrespective of his marital status.
4. Trimble APPLIED
A need for swift, efficacious paternity proceedings is crucial to
the realization of a child's support rights. In the absence of pre-
sumptions of paternity, a proceeding is his only avenue toward a
parity with legitimate children in terms of familial rights and du-
ties. It is incumbent on those states which rely on criminal non-
support proceedings to enforce the child's rights to enact legislation
that is now constitutionally mandated.
Trimble reiterated the means-analysis test used in Jimenez and
Lucas; the constitutionality of the statutory provision "depends
upon the character of the discrimination and its relation to legiti-
mate legislative aims." 03
At a minimum, the purpose of the paternity statutes is to deter-
mine the child's parentage and thereby insure that he receives some
measure of support from his father. Denying the child and certain
other interested persons the right to bring the action operates di-
rectly to contravene those purposes.
A provision which restricts standing to bring the action in a way
200. UPA § 6(b).
201. UPA § 6(c).
202. Id.
203. Trimble v. Gordon, 430 U.S. 762, 769 (1977).
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that could prevent a child's determination of paternity is unjustifi-
able under Thimble. It is irrelevant to say that the discrimination
is aimed at the omitted "next of kin" or the omitted "deceased
mother's personal representative" when the effect of that omission
is so prejudicial to the child.
Florida and six other jurisdictions'"4 permit only the child's
mother to sue. This was justified by the probability that her knowl-
edge was the most relevant and accurate and because the child was
most often in her custody. Thus, support payments following a find-
ing of paternity would be sent to her for the child's benefit. While
the presumptions are accurate they are not true in every case. There
are certainly many illegitimate childen who are not living with their
mothers and there are other ways to have paternity established than
to rely on the testimony of the mother when she is recalcitrant.
There are mothers who wish to conceal the father's identity and
many who execute releases with the putative father in an attempt
to extinguish all paternal rights and obligations. Such releases have
been held not to bar the child's right to have his parentage deter-
mined and his right to paternal support enforced. 0 If a mother's
affirmative action in contracting to release the father cannot deter
the suit, it is inconceivable that her inaction should be allowed to
do so.
B. Statute of Limitations
1. INTRODUCTION
Several reasons have been asserted to justify limiting the period
during which a paternity action may be brought, including the fol-
lowing: to protect a man from having to defend himself against an
action brought years after the birth of the child; to bar stale claims;
and to bring an end to litigation.00 The limitations period is meant
to encourage the mother to sue promptly0 7 when the child is young
and most in need of support (to enable his mother to care for him).
There is a fear that the risk of perjury is increased as time passes
and that difficulties of proof loom greater.0 8
The Supreme Court in Gomez v. Perez °0 recognized the right
204. Arkansas, District of Columbia, Kansas, Oklahoma, West Virginia and Wisconcin.
205. Shinall v. Pergeorelis, 325 So. 2d 431 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1975); Walker v. Walker, 266
So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972); Fox v. Hoehenshelt, 528 P.2d 1376 (Or. App. 1974); Reynolds
v. Richardson, 483 S.W.2d 747 (Tenn. App. 1971); State v. Bowen, 80 Wash. 2d 808, 498 P.2d
877 (1972).
206. Cessna v. Montgomery, 28 Ill. App. 3d 887, 329 N.E.2d 861, 863 (Il1. 1975).
207. Id.
208. Id. at 865.
209. 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
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of an illegitimate child to receive support from his father, where the
state has created a judicially enforceable right in a legitimate child
to such support. An, illegitimate child is also entitled to support
during his minority."' Thus his claim, like that of a legitimate child,
is not "stale" while the duty to support exists."' While it is desirable
to encourage the mother to bring the action promptly, her failure
to do so cannot constitutionally bar the child's right to support."'
The risk of perjury is always present to some degree in paternity
cases and may even increase with time, but since the provisions of
the statutes allow for tolling and revivals, other plaintiffs would not
be barred from suing many years after birth despite the risk of
perjury. The only truly effective means of reducing perjury is to
compel extensive blood testing and to educate the parties as to the
degree of accuracy now achieved by modern testing procedures."' As
the Court remarked in Gomez: "We recognize the lurking problems
with respect to proof of paternity. Those problems are not to be
lightly brushed aside, but neither can they be made into an impene-
trable barrier that works to shield otherwise invidious discrimina-
tion."2
2. FLORIDA
The four year limitations period relating to paternity adjudica-
tion in Florida can be found in Florida Statute section 95.11.15 This
limitation is tolled by the absence of the putative father from the
State"' and by voluntary payments by the putative father, during
the time of those payments." 7
210. Cessna v. Montgomery, 28 I11. App. 3d 887, 329 N.E.2d 861 (Ill. 1975).
211. Id.
212. Id.; Kaur v. Singh Chawla, 11 Wash. App. 362, 522 P.2d 1198 (1974). See text
accompanying notes 239-42 infra.
213. See text accompanying notes 312-25, 332-42 infra.
214. 409 U.S. 535, 538 (1973).
215. "95.11 Limitations other than for recovery of real property.-Actions other than for
recovery of real property shall be commenced as follows:
(3) within four years
(b) An action relating to the determination of paternity." FLA. STAT. § 95.11 (1975).
216. "95.051. When limitations tolled.-
(1) The running of the time under any statute of limitations . . . is tolled by:
(a) Absence from the state of the person to be sued.
(e) Voluntary payments by the alleged father of the child in paternity actions during the
time of the payments." FLA. STAT. § 95.051 (1975).
217. Id.
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3. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Eight states"' currently provide no limitation period in their
paternity statutes. This has been interpreted to mean that no limi-
tation is imposed on the bringing of the action."' In the five states
which have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act,220 the action also
may be brought at any time, with certain reservations where the
presumed father has married or attempted to marry the mother."3
The majority of the states impose statutory limitation periods of
one year,22 two years,2 3 three years,2 4 four years,225 five years2 or
six years. 27 Specific provision for tolling the statute during the fa-
ther's absence from the state is found in seven paternity statutes. 5
A separate, longer limitations period applies to welfare authorities
218. Arizona, Arkansas, California, Delaware, Maine, Massachusetts, Minnesota and
Ohio.
219. See generally Annot. 59 A.L.R.3d 685, 739 (1974).
220. California, Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota, and Washington. For a list of statu-
tory sections, see note 180 supra.
221. See text accompanying note 244 infra.
222. KAN. STATS. ANN. § 38-1104 (1973); MIss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-9 (1972); N.H. REV.
STAT, ANN. § 168-A:12 (Supp. 2 1975); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 13.01 (Vernon Supp.
1976).
223. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 12(9) (1975); D.C. CODE § 16-2342 (1973); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
106 /i, § 54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976) (declared unconstitutional in Cessna v. Montgomery,
28 Ill. App. 3d 887, 329 N.E.2d 861 (Il1. 1975)); IND. CODE § 31-4-1-26 (1976); IOWA CODE ANN.
§ 16-2342 (1973); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.340 (1973); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT 517 (Consol. Supp.
1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4323 (Purdon 1973); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-8-9 (1976);
TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-224 (1977); Wyo. STAT. § 14-91 (1965).
224. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-435a (West Supp. 1977); IDAHO CODE § 7-1107 (Supp.
1977); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.031 (Baldwin 1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-
308(2)(Supp. 1977) (UPA: where no presumed father within three years after birth or effective
date of act); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14 (1976); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-06 (Supp. 1977)(UPA,
same as Montana supra); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 83 (West 1966); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-
18 (1969); W. VA. CODE § 48-7-1 (1976).
225. FLA. STAT. § 95.11(3)(b)(1975); NEa. REV. STAT. § 13-111 (1974).
226. COLO. REv. STAT. § 19-6-101(2) (1973); MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-308(1)(b)
(Supp. 1977) (modified version of UPA-no later than five years after the birth of the child
where there is a presumed father); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-17-06 (Supp. 1977) (uniform, UPA:
where there is a presumed father but the action is brought to declare the non-existence of
the father child relationship); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060 (Supp. 1976) (modified
version of UPA: where presumed father, no limitation; where no presumed father five year
limitation on action brought by welfare authorities following birth or father's last support
payments).
227. MICH. Comp. LAWS ANN. § 722.714(b) (1968); OR. REv. STAT. § 109.135(3) (1975);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 331 n.11 (1974) (must be instituted within six years after the cause
of action accrues and not afterward) (1928 Opin. of Atty. Gen. 45).
228. D.C. CODE § 16-2342 (1973); FLA. STAT. § 95.051(1)(a) (1975); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch.
106 A, § 54 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976)(unconstitutional per Cessna v. Montgomery, 28 I1.
App. 3d 887, 329 N.E.2d 861 (Ill. 1975); IND. CODE § 31-4-1-26 (1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.714(b) (Supp. 1976); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-9 (1972); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §
26.26.060 (Supp. 1976).
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in two states."2 In addition where the putative father has acknowl-
edged the child3 ° or contributed to his support 3' or where his pa-
ternity has been judicially established 32 the statute of limitations
may be tolled, may begin to run again or may cease to apply.
Several states (and the UPA) provide for the contingency that
a father may flee the jurisdiction prior to the child's birth and thus
229. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 517(b) (Consol. Supp. 1976)(if the action is brought by a public
welfare official not more than 10 years after birth of child); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-224 (1977)
(welfare authorities can bring suit anytime before the child reaches 18 years old if he is likely
to become a public charge).
230 ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 12(9)(1975) (limitation apparently ceases; acknowledgement
need not be formal, Ward v. State, 42 Ala. App. 529, 170 So. 2d 500 (1964); CoLo. REV. STAT.
§ 19-6-101(2)(1973) (limitation apparently ceases); IDAHO CODE § (Supp. 1977)(must bring
within five yeas after acknowledgement); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 3 , § 54 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1976) (within two years after acknowledgement; declared unconstitutional in Cessna v. Mont-
gomery, 28 Ill. App. 3d 887, 329 N.E.2d 861 (Ill. 1975); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-4-1-26 (1976)
(within two years after acknowledgement); IOWA CODE ANN. § 675.33 (West 1950) (limitation
apparently ceases); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.031 (Baldwin 1973) (until the child reaches
18); MIcH. CoMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.712 (1968) (if the father acknowledges within six years after
birth, then suit may be commenced within an additional six years from the time of acknowl-
edgement); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-9 (1972) (limitation apparently ceases); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 126.340 (1973) (limitation apparently ceases); N.Y. FAM. CT. AcT § 517 (Consol. Supp. 1976)
(limitation apparently ceases); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 83 (West 1966) (If paternity
acknowledged in writing, support obligation enforceable until majority, but retroactive for
only three years from suit); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18i § 4323 (Purdon 1973) (within two years of
acknowledgement); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-8-9 (1976) (limitation apparently ceases);
TPENN. CODE ANN. § 36-224 (1977) (limitation apparently ceases).
231. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 12(9) (limitation apparently ceases); COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-
101(2) (1973) (limitation apparently ceases); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-435a (West Supp.
1977) (three years from last support payment); D.C. CODE §. 16-2342 (1973) (within one year
after putative father ceased making contributions for support); FLA. STAT. § 95.051(1)(e)
(1975) (tolls during time of payments); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 1063/, § 54 (Smith-Hurd Supp.
1976) (within two years after support given; declared unconstitutional in Cessna v. Montgo-
rhaery, 28 11. App. 3d 887, 329 N.E.2d 861 (Ill. 1975); IND. CODE § 31-4-1-26 (1976) (within
two years after support given); IowA CODE ANN. § 675.33 (West 1946) (limitation apparently
ceases); MICH. CoMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.714 (1968) (if father gives support within first six years
following birth then an additional six years from last support payment); NEV. REV. STAT. §
126.340 (1973) (limitation apparently ceases); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 517 (Consol. Supp. 1976)
(limitation apparently ceases); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-14 (1976) (three years after last support
payment); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 83 (West 1966) (three years from last contribution for
support or education, but if father acknowledges in writing, obligation enforceable to age 18);
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4323 (Purdon 1973) (within two years after support contribution);
R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-18 (1969) (within two years after termination of support payments by
father); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-8-9 (1976) (limitation apparently ceases); TENN. CODE
ANN. § 36-224 (1977) (limitation apparently ceases); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.060
(Supp. 1976).
232. IND. CODE § 31-4-1-26 (1976) (within two years after judicially established); IOWA
CODE ANN. § 675.33 (West 1946) (limitation apparently ceases); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.031
(Baldwin 1973) (until age 18); NEV. REV. STAT. § 126.340 (1973) (limitation apparently
ceases); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 83 (West 1966) (until majority but retroactive three years
only); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-8-9 (1976) (limitation apparently ceases); WYo. STAT.
§ 14-91 (1965) (limitation apparently ceases).
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permit the mother to initiate the suit during pregnancy.23 In such
case, the action is stayed until after birth.234
One device that has been used by courts to evade the harshness
of the limitations rule is to assert that it applies only to the
mother.? 5 The child still may sue after the limitations period, pre-
sumably as long as the support obligation exists.23 "The right of an
illegitimate child to assert a claim for parental support is too funda-
mental to permit its forfeiture by its mother's failure to timely insti-
tute a filiation proceeding. . . . The law places no similar barrier
to the enforcement of a legitimate child's right. '237
A New York court avoided the two-year statute of limitations
by asserting that it does not apply to matrimonial actions wherein
the paternity of the child is open to challenge.2 38
The Illinois Supreme Court was the first state supreme court
to hold unconstitutional a limitations period in a paternity statute
as a violation of the equal protection clause. 29 The Illinois provi-
sion 240 is less harsh than others in providing for two-year "revivals"
of the limitation period where the father acknowledges paternity in
open court,24' in a sworn written statement, or by contributing to the
"support, maintenance, education, and welfare" of the child.2 12 The
time is also tolled during the putative father's absence from the
state.2 3 Nevertheless, the court found that "[u]nder either the
'rational basis' test or the 'overinclusive or underinclusive' test,
233. ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 12(9) (1975); Amz. REV. STAT. § 12-844 (Supp. 1976-1977); ARK.
STAT. ANN. § 34-712 (1962); D.C. CODE § 16-2342 (1973); IOWA CODE ANN. § 675.9 (West 1950);
MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.714 (1968); NEB. REV. STAT. § 13-111 (1974); N.Y. FAM. CT.
ACT § 517 (Consol. Supp. 1976); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-8-9 (1976); TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 36-224 (1977); UPA § 6(e).
234. See note 233 supra.
235. Palmer v. Mangum, 338 So. 2d 1002 (Miss. 1976); Kaur v. Singh Chawla, 11 Wash.
App. 362, 522 P.2d 1198 (1974). Contra, Walker v. Walker, 266 So. 2d 385 (Fla. 1st Dist. 1972);
Storm v. None, 57 Misc. 2d 342, 291 N.Y.S.2d 515 (1968).
236. The Supreme Court of Washington in State v. Bowen concluded that the Washing-
ton two year statute of limitations
does not signify a legislative intent that a putative father should escape liability
for child support if a filiation proceeding is not instituted within the 2-year period,
inasmuch as there is no similar limitation upon the time within which the prose-
cutor can bring an action to enforce support under R.C.W. 26.20 [criminal non-
support statute].
80 Wash. 808, 811, 498 P.2d 877, 879 (1972).
237. Kaur v. Singh Chawla, 11 Wash. App. 362, 366, 522 P.2d 1198, 1200 (1974).
238. Vargas v. Vargas, 54 App. Div. 2d 590, 387 N.Y.S.2d 168 (App. Div. 1976).
239. Cessna v. Montgomery, 28 Ill. App. 3d 887, 329 N.E.2d 861 (1975).





UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
Chapter 106 3/4, Section 54 denies equal protection of law to the
illegitimate child and to the mother of the illegitimate child.""24
4. UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
Section 7 of the UPA treats the conflicting interests of initiating
a prompt action to establish the parent-child relationship and pro-
tection of the child's rights. Where the parents were married or
attempted marriage and other conditions are met under section 4,245
the child, his mother and the presumed father may bring an action
at any time to declare the existence of the presumed father-child
relationship. Where the purpose of the action is to prove the non-
existence of this relationship a five-year maximum limitation is
imposed.24 Where the presumption of paternity arises in the ab-
sence of marriage or attempted marriage 47 the action may be
brought at any time.
Different standards obtain where the child has no presumed
father under section 4 of the UPA.248 The action may not be brought
later than three years after the birth of the child. However, this
limitation does not apply to actions brought by or on behalf of a
child whose paternity has not been determined. In the latter case,
an action can be maintained until three years after the child reaches
majority. The time periods here and in section 6 are intended to
have no effect on the time within which one may assert a right to
inheritance or to a succession beyond the time provided by law for
the closing of decedents' estates.
5. RECOMMENDATION
Adopting the standards of the Uniform Parentage Act, sections
6 and 7, protects the alleged father against stale claims where his
conduct has not raised a presumption of paternity. The overriding
concern for the child's right to support mandates that, even in the
absence of a presumed father, the time limitation should be enforce-
able against him only after he has reached majority. It would be
irrational to equalize the support rights of illegitimate children with
legitimate children by statute and then prohibit the realization of
these rights through arbitrary time bars.
244. 28 Ill. App. 3d at 891, 329 N.E.2d at 863.245. UPA § 4(a)(l)-(3).
246. Id. § 6(a)(1)-(2).
247. Id. §§ 4(a)(4), (5). See text accompanying notes 199-200 supra.
248. UPA § 4.
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C. Amount of Support
1. INTRODUCTION
Gomez v. Perez, 248.1 read broadly, mandates identical treatment
for illegitimates in the amount and duration of parental support.
Nearly all of the statutes are drawn in vague terms. Since the deter-
mination of the support obligation is within the court's discretion,
it can award anything from a pittance to a parity share.
The standards used in determining child support awards for
legitimate children following their parents' divorce or separation are
rationally drawn and ought to apply to illegitimates. In such cases
the amount depends on the need of the child and the father's ability
to pay. 49 In addition to the actual needs of the child, the father is
under a legal duty to provide his child with those advantages which
are reasonable to his financial condition and status in society.25
Where the child's needs exceed the father's ability to pay, the court
should award only such amount as the father may reasonably be
able to pay.25'
In those states where the entire burden of support is on the
father if he has the means, 52 then if the father has the means the
mother's ability to contribute should not diminish his obligation.25
In those states where the duty rests on both parents to support their
children to the extent of their abilities,254 the father should still be
required to contribute to the children's support as far as he is capa-
ble . 255
It is a perplexing question, and one well beyond the scope of this
article, as to how the duty of child support should be allocated
between the parents.2 56 A number of states impose by statute or case
law an equal duty of support on the mother, some say that this is
248.1 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
249. E.g., Neckman v. Neckman, 298 So. 2d 534 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1974); Simonet v. Simo-
net, 279 So. 2d 35 (Fla. 4th Dist. 1973). See also Annot., 1 A.L.R.3d 324, 335 (1965); Annot.,
1 A.L.R. 3d 382, 396 (1965); Annot., 2 A.L.R.3d 537, 545 (1965); Annot., 56 A.L.R. 2d 1207,
1216, 1223 (1957).
250. Williams v. Williams, 261 N.C. 48, 134 S.E.2d 227 (1964).
251. Woodward v. Woodward, 428 P.2d 389 (Wyo. 1967).
252. E.g., Dworkis v. Dworkis, 111 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1959).
253. Id.
254. Spaulding v. Spaulding, 204 N.W.2d 634, 636 (Iowa 1973); IowA CODE ANN. § 597.14
(West 1950); D.C. CODE § 16-916 (1973); UNIFORM MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT § 309.
255. Shrager v. Shrager, 144 Conn. 483, 134 A.2d 69 (1957).
256. Fisher and Saxe, Family Support Obligations: The Equal Protection Problem, 46
N.Y.S.B.J. 441 (1974); Goodman, Rights and Obligations of Child Support, 7 Sw. U.L. REV.
36 (1975); Note, Pennsylvania Equal Rights Amendment Reverses the Common Law Pre-
sumption that the Husband Because of his Sex, Should Bear the Primary Duty of Child
Support, 10 TULSA L.J. 485 (1975).
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mandated by the state's adoption of the Equal Rights Amend-
ment. 57 But there is much to be said for reducing the mother's need
to work so that she personally may attend to the needs of the pre-
school child.
Other features of the support provisions that merit attention
are the duration of the support obligation, whether the award can
be modified, and whether the court can order periodic payments. As
with the questions of the degree of support and the allocation be-
tween parents, there seems no reasonable justification for treating
illegitimate children differently from legitimates.
Two cases which recently came out of the New York Family
Courts illustrate why a definitive declaration of full equality in
amount of support is vastly preferable to the less precise standards
embodied in most statutes. The New York legislature was candid
in formulating the standards for support of illegitimates as con-
trasted with legitimate children. Section 413 of the Family Court
Act 58 applies to legitimate children and establishes the tests for
both the amount of the award due to a child born "during wedlock"
and the apportionment of that award to his parents. The father is
primarily responsible for the support of the children; the mother's
liability exists only in the event of the father's incapability, death
or disappearance. He is liable to pay "a fair and reasonable sum
according to his means." In contrast, section 513 of the Family
Court Act25 makes both parents jointly and severally liable for the
"necessary support and education of the child born out of wedlock."
Section 545 of the Family Court Act26 establishes the standard by
which the award is to be apportioned to the parents. The court may
impose all or part of the obligation on the father. Three factors are
to be considered: the welfare of the child, the financial capacity of
the parents, and the station in life of the mother.26 Such a formula
is not harsh but it is unequal.
In Ellen N. v. Stuart K.212 the court upheld the disparity as
being "rationally based on the government's interest in the welfare
of children born in wedlock and those born out of wedlock to their
parents."2 ' In so holding, it rejected the conclusion of Storm v.
None,"4 which had found Levy v. Louisiana"' to require identical
257. E.g., Conway v. Dana, 456 Pa. 536, 539, 318 A.2d 324, 326 (1974).
258. N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 413 (McKinney 1975).
259. Id. § 513.
260. Id. § 545.
261. Ellen N. v. Stuart K., 88 Misc. 2d 280, 286, 387 N.Y.S.2d 367, 373 (Fam. Ct. 1976).
262. Id.
263. Id. at 372.
264. 57 Misc. 2d 342, 291 N.Y.S.2d 515 (Faro. Ct. 1968).
265. 391 U.S. 68 (1967).
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equality in standards for support between illegitimate and legiti-
mate children. The Storm court held that section 413 standards
applied to illegitimates as well as to children born in wedlock.
The "rational basis" for the Ellen N. decision is adduced from
the fact that a man is not required to support the mother of his child
unless he is or was married to her. Thus it is possible for the parents
of the child to enjoy very different standards of living. The entire
improbable argument reads as follows:
The legislature has determined that the out of wedlock child
should not be given support according to the father's standard of
living solely. This would tend to cause strife in the child's house-
hold where there is a great disparity between the standards of
living of the father and mother. This could create a situation of
the child eating filet mignon and the rest of his household eating
gruel, where the standard of living of the father is vastly higher
than that of the mother. When the father has limited means and
the mother a substantially higher standard, the child would be
placed in a "Cinderella" role in the family unit. Since the legisla-
ture deems it in the best interest of an out of wedlock child to be
within the relative life style of the members of his household, Sec.
513 F.C.A. provides a reasonable and rational test."'
The absurdity of this remark requires no comment. The legitimate
child in New York, in contrast, is entitled to receive support accord-
ing to his father's standard of living because it is assumed that he
lived in a household which included both parents. His accustomed
standard is that of his father and should be maintained. The dis-
tinction is rational only if we accept the premise that nearly all
children of divorced families lived in a two parent home and that
nearly all illegitimate children lived in a one parent home with other
siblings (who receive little or no support from one other than the
mother or welfare bureau). In fact, more than one-quarter of Ameri-
can children-more than one half of the black children-are not
living with their biological fathers. Less than one-third of the chil-
dren whose parents are separated or divorced see their fathers on a
regular basis."7 The classification is vastly over-inclusive in denying
illegitimate children who have no siblings and those who may have
lived for many years with their fathers the same amount of support
to which similarly situated legitimate children would be entitled.
If the legislature's purpose is to look to the welfare of the child,
266. 387 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
267. Miami Herald, March 2, 1977, at 1, col. 2. From a survey sponsored by the Founda-
tion for Child Development, conducted by Temple University's Institute for Survey Research.
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it would give every illegitimate child the greatest amount of support
which the father could reasonably afford in order to compensate the
child for the legal, social and economic burdens which flow from the
father's failure to legitimize the child. If the mother derives some
benefit from the additional funds for her child, no particular harm
is done. In many cases she has assumed full responsibility for rear-
ing the child alone.
In the month following Ellen N. a different New York Family
Court dealt with a second "minor" example of differential treat-
ment in the support provisions of the Family Court Act. Shan F. v.
Francis F.28" deals with section 51669 which denies to the mother
and child all remedies allowing for an increase in the amount for
support or education of the child where the father has completely
performed a court-approved compromise. In the case of legitimate
children, support is always subject to escalation on the basis of
increased needs of the child or means of the parent.270 The court held
that this disparity is "unconstitutional under the equal protection
guarantee, as applied to illegitimate children . . . whose paternity
was clear at the time of the agreement." '' The test used to deter-
mine the constitutionality of a differentiation based on legitimacy
"eschews mere conceptual, possible rationality; instead it requires
a realistic consideration of whether the measure will in fact substan-
tially advance the State purpose and also of whether the purpose
could be obtained by means other than a discrimination against
illegitimates as a class."272 After enumerating fhe customarily in-
voked interests of the state in dealing with illegitimacy,27 the court
failed to find a rational connection between these purposes and a
classification which permits the father of an illegitimate to "buy his
peace.""' By reducing the liability of the father, the mother's sup-
port burden is correspondingly increased, but in many cases it is the
state which will have to fulfill the child's needs above the amount
provided for in the father's compromise.
Section 516, by barring paternity and support actions, might
provide an incentive for fathers to execute support agreements. This
268. 387 N.Y.S.2d 593 (Faro. Ct. 1976).
269. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 516 (1974).
270. N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr § 413, 414 (Supp. 1976).
271. 387 N.Y.S.2d at 595.
272. Id. at 598.
273. Protection of the family unit, promotion of the state's interest in protecting legiti-
mate family relationships, and condemnation of irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of
marriage. Id. (citing Weber v. Aetna Cas. & Sur. Co., 406 U.S. 164, 173, 175; Labine v.
Vincent, 401 U.S. 532, 538).
274. 387 N.Y.S.2d at 598.
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could benefit illegitimates as a class, but it gives no advantages to
those children whose paternity is clear.
The Shan F. court interprets the parental support duty under
New York law as requiring "support of children on a standard of
living approximating the parent's own-a rule which by Constitu-
tional necessity applies to illegitimate children equally with legiti-
mate children. '275
Such a variance in interpretation, especially in courts which are
bound by the same precedents, bespeaks the need for a formula
giving absolute equality of support rights to illegitimates.
2. FLORIDA
In Florida, illegitimate children fare even worse. Florida Stat-
utes section 742.041 prescribes a fixed scale of payments depending
on the child's age26 and invests discretion in the judge to increase
or reduce those amounts "depending upon the circumstances and
ability of the defendant."277 No mention whatsoever is made of the
child's needs! While the clause granting discretion rescues this sup-
port standard from being prima facie unconstitutional, in practice
the schedule is followed "like a gospel. ' 278 The rule of construction,
enunciated in Clarke v. Blackburn, 2 71 asserts that the statutory sup-
275. Id. at 601.
276. (1) The court shall order the defendant to pay monthly for the care and
support of such child the following amounts:
(a) From date of birth to 6th birthday-$40 per month.
(b) From 6th birthday to 12th birthday-$60 per month.
(c) From 12th birthday to 15th birthday-$90 per month.
(d) From 15th birthday to 18th birthday-$110 per month.
FLA. STAT. § 742.041(1) (1975).
277. FLA. STAT. § 742.041(2) (1975).
278. Interviewwith Quentin T. Eldred, Director, Domestic Relations Staff, Dade
County, Fla. (June 30, 1977).
279. 151 So. 2d 325, 329-30 (Fla. 2d Dist. 1963).
At common law the putative father is under no legal liability to support his
illegitimate child. If such liability exists, it must be that imposed by statute. If
imposed by statute, the father is liable within the limits and subject to the
provisions of the statute and it is permissible to enforce such liability only in the
manner specified in the statute.
The case refused extradition of a Florida resident to North Carolina for trial on the charge of
non-support of an illegitimate child. Defendant lived in North Carolina at time of fathering
and in Florida at time of non-support. The court reasoned that since,illegitimates are not
protected under the Florida non-support statute (§ 856.04) and since there was no prior
Florida determination of paternity, he was under no obligation to support the child. He was
not permitted to initiate a chapter 742 proceeding to disprove paternity because of the §
742.011 standing restrictions. This "Catch-22" was corrected by a 1965 amendment adding
subsection (2), making it a crime to withhold support from an illegitimate child whose
paternity has been established in this or an other jurisdiction.
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port schedule should be followed strictly because the remedy is in
derogation of the common law. In only one reported case has there
been a substantially higher award and it was made in light of the
father's $6 million in assets and his 6-figure income.280
Although Gomez2"' did not articulate full equalityof support,
it arguably can be so interpreted, and since illegitimacy cases
through Trim ble282 will permit only those discriminatory classifica-
tions which are "carefully tuned to alternative considerations," we
cannot but conclude that the Florida statutory provision fails. The
approach which has been more or less consistently applied since
Reed in Weber, Jimenez, Lucas and Trimble is to examine whether
the avowed purpose of the statute is significantly promoted by the
classification.
One expression of the avowed purpose of Florida's paternity
statute is found in Flores v. State:283 "The statute was not designed
to punish the accused for crime, but to make him contribute to the
support of the child. . . . [I]t is a civil procedure to enforce a police
regulation designed to secure immunity of the public from the
child's support." 84 Since the first purpose is only to make the father
contribute, rather than to make him the primary supporter (as is
the case with the legitimate children in Florida), 5 it is effectuated
by the classification. The second purpose of immunity is served only
if the prescribed amounts are sufficient to make the child ineligible
for welfare benefits. We will assume that the court will increase the
award in all circumstances where the father is able to pay more and
thereby fully immunize the state in every situation. Of course,
where the parents are unable to provide for their children the state
must assume this burden, and an action for non-support would not
lie.
Clearly means-analysis is not entirely helpful in deciding sup-
port cases which discriminate against illegitimate children. What is
needed is a recognition that the right of a child to the support of his
parents is sufficiently akin to a fundamental personal right that any
distinction made by legislatures between classes of children is im-
permissible regardless of where the lines are drawn: legitimate, legi-
timated, illegitimate, adopted, male, female, gifted, handicapped.
They are all children, all wholly dependent on the support of others
280. Plever v. Bray, 266 So. 2d 54, 55 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1972).
281. Gomez v. Perez, 409 U.S. 535 (1973).
282. Trimble v. Gordon, 97 S. Ct. 1459 (1977).
283. 73 So. 234 (Fla. 1916).
284. Id. at 236-37.
285. Dworkis v. Dworkis, 111 So. 2d 70 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1959).
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(parents or welfare authorities) and thus similarly situated in terms
of support needs so that any classification which excludes some of
them is underinclusive.
3. OTHER JURISDICTIONS
Fewer than twenty paternity statutes use language which shows
an intent that the father's duty is to be fully equal with regard to
the support of his children, whether legitimate or illegitimate. Typi-
cal phrasing is that he is subject to all obligations for the "support,"
"maintenance," "care," and "education of the child."2 , A slightly
lesser number of statutes use language which implies a lesser obliga-
tion,2"7 for example, "not less than $10 monthly," ' "as under the
286. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 12(4) (1975) (subject to all obligations for care, maintenance
and education); GA. CODE § 74-202 (1975) (father bound to maintain); ILL. ANN. STATS. ch.
106 3/i, § 52 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976) (to the same extent as if a legitimate child); KANS.
STAT. § 38-1106 (1973); Ky. REv. STAT. § 406.011 (Supp. 1976) (liable for necessary support
to the same extent as if legitimate child); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 271 (Supp. 1976-
1977) (identical to Kentucky provision, UAP);MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66H (Supp. 1976);
Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-7 (1972) (identical to Kentucky provision, UAP); NEB. REv. STAT. §
13-102 (1974) (father liable as if child were born in lawful wedlock); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-15
(1976) (rights, duties and obligations of the mother and father with regard to support and
custody remain the same as if the child were the legitimate child of the mother and father;
however, under § 49-14, the establishment of paternity does not have the effect of legitima-
tion); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 83 (West Supp. 1976) (liable for support and education to
the same extent as the father of a child born in wedlock); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-223 (1977);
W. VA. CODE § 48-7-4 (1976) (such sums as the court may deem proper for maintenance,
education and support); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 52.37 (West Supp. 1977-1978) (all past support
from birth and all future support to 18); UPA § 2 provides that "[tihe parent and child
relationship extends equally to every child and to every parent, regardless of the marital
status of the parents." Facts which the court may consider in determining the actual amount
of the support obligation are listed in § 15(e) and resemble those used by courts to determine
the amount of support owed legitimate children following the separation or divorce of their
parents. These provisions are applied in the six states which have adopted the UPA (Califor-
nia, Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota, Washington, Wyoming) except that California omits
the list of factors.
287. ARK. STAT. ANN.. § 34-706 (1962) (not less than $10 monthly from birth to age 16);
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-2349 (West 1966) (payments for maintenance and education com-
mensurate with father's ability to pay); FLA. STAT. § 742.041 (1975) (see note 276 supra);
IDAHO CODE § 7-1121 (Supp. 1977) (a fair and reasonable sum); IND. CODE ANN. § 31-4-1-19
(Burns Cum. Supp. 1976) (adequate support); IOWA CODE ANN. § 675.1 (West 1946); MAss.
GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 14 (West 1970) (such order as may be considered expedient); MINN.
STAT. ANN. § 257.261 (West Supp. 1977) (proper and adequate); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. §
3111.17 (Page Supp. 1976) (reasonable weekly sum); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.155 (Supp. 1975)
(appropriate sum for past and future support); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4323 (Purdon 1973)
(fine or in addition payment of periodic sums); S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-8-1 (1976)
(obligation of parents to support children under the laws for the support of the poor applicable
to children born out of wedlock); VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 339 (1974) (in such manner and
proportion as the court judges proper and for such time as the child is likely to be unable to
support himself and no longer).
288. ARK. STAT. ANN. § 34-706 (1962).
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laws for the support of the poor" '8 and "adequate support."290 Only
a thorough examination of case law would reveal how such provi-
sions are interpreted. In some states specific authority is given for
the payments to be periodic29' and the award modifiable.292 Both of
these factors are indispensable to the welfare of the child and, one
may hope, are being applied by the courts regardless of their ab-
sence from the statutes.
The duration of payments varies from "for such time as the
child is likely to be unable to support himself and no longer"9 3 to
sixteen, 94 eighteen,2 5 more than eighteen under certain circumstan-
ces,2 ' to twenty-one297 and beyond if incapacitated.299 The father's
duty may cease before that time in the event of legal emancipation299
or adoption.2° An occasional provision allows for the recoupment of
289. S.D. COMPILED LAWS ANN. § 25-8-1 (1976).
290. IND. CODE ANN. § 31-4-1-19 (Burns Cum. Supp. 1976).
291. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-105 (1973); CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-442a (West Supp.
1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66H (Supp. 1976); MICH. Cow. LAWS ANN. § 722.717 (West
Supp. 1962); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 257.261 (West Supp. 1977); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.17
(Page Supp. 1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4323 (Purdon 1973); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36.229
(1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 52.37 (West Supp. 1977-1978).
292. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-2349 (West 1966); FLA. STAT. § 742.041 (1975); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 16, §66H (Supp. 1976); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 14 (West 1970); Oa. REy.
STAT. § 109.155 (Supp. 1975); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-10 (1969).
293. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 339 (1974).
294. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-2349 (West 1966); S.D. CODIFIED LAWS § 25-8-29 (1976).
295. COLO. REV. STAT. 0 19.6.105 (1973); CONN. GEN, STAT. § 52-442a (Supp. 1977); DEL.
CODE tit. 13, 0 502 (1974); FiL. STAT. § 742.041 (1975): GA. CODE § 74-202 (1975); IDAHO CODE
§ 7-1121 (Supp. 1977); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 3/4, § 52 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1976); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 16, § 66H (Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.717 (1962); NEV. REV. STAT.
§ 126.230 (1975) (females only; males receive until age 21); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 22-4-16 (Supp.
1975); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.17 (Page Supp. 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-10 (1969);
W. VA. CODE § 48-7-4 (1976).
296. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-105 (1973) (until 21 in the discretion of the court; past 21
if unable to care for self because of physical or mental handicap); IDAHO CODE § 7-1121 (Supp.
1977) (if continues education past 18 court can order payments until 21 or discontinue); MD.
ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66H (Supp. 1976) (after 18 if mental or physical infirmity); NEV. REV.
STAT. § 126.230 (1975) (if male, until 21); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 545 (McKinney 1975) (in every
case until 21); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.155 (Supp. 1975) (while the child is attending school until
21); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-10 (1969) (if child is incapacitated by physical or mental disability
to at least 21).
297. NEV. REv. STAT. § 126.230 (1975) (if male, until 21); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 545
(McKinney 1975) (in every case until 21).
298. Colorado, Maryland and Rhode Island; see note 296 supra.
299. COLO. REV. STAT. § 19-6-105 (1973); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-10 (Supp. 1976). See also
GA. CODE § 74-202 (1975) (father bound to support child until child reaches 18, marries or
becomes self supporting, whichever occurs first); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66H (Supp. 1976)
(until 18 years, dies, marries, or becomes self-supporting).
300. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-2349 (West 1966); ILL. ANN. STAT. ch. 106 /, § 52 (Smith-
Hurd Supp. 1976).
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past care and support paid by the motherel or third parties. 2
In a number of states a paternity determination results in the
criminal or civil non-support statutes becoming applicable to the
"illegitimate" child as well.13 But in only two states,3 4 in addition
to the five3e which have adopted the Uniform Parentage Act, does
the finding result in legitimation for all purposes. Tennessee finds
the child legitimate for the purposes of support and inheritance.306
4. THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
Once a determination of paternity is made under the UPA the
judgment is determinative of the parent-child relationship for all
purposes."7 The court may order a new or amended birth certificate
when necessary." 8 The order may contain other provisions directed
against the appropriate party concerning the duty of support, cus-
tody and guardianship of the child, visitation privileges and any
other matter in the child's best interests.0 9 Ordinarily, the support
award will be periodic, but a lump sum or the purchase of an annu-
ity may be ordered when in the child's best interest.3 0
Nine factors are enumerated in section 15 to illustrate what the
court should consider in fixing the amount to be paid by the father
for support: (1) the needs of the child; (2) the standard of living and
circumstances of the parents; (3) the relative financial means of the
parents; (4) the earning ability of the parents; (5) the need and
301. Amz. REv. STAT. § 12-849 (Supp. 1976-1977); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 52.37 (West Supp.
1977-1978).
302. IOWA CODE ANN. § 675.4 (West 1946).
303. ALASKA STAT. §§ 11.35.100, 25.20.050 (1962); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 13, § 502 (1974);
D.C. CODE ENCYCL. §§ 22-903 to 22-905 (West 1966) (applicable even if father has only
indirectly acknowledged by voluntarily making support contributions); MAss. GEN. LAWS
ANN. ch. 273, § 15 (West 1970) (father who refuses to contribute reasonably to support and
maintenance is guilty of a misdemeanor).
304. IDAHO CODE § 7-1104 (Supp. 1976); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 13.09 (Vernon
Supp. 1976). Some commentators have said that Oregon and Arizona have eliminated all
distinctions between legitimate and illegitimate children or have at least substantially elimi-
nated legal discrimination against illegitimate children. See, e.g., Comment to §§ 1 and 2,
UPA; Gray and Rudovsky, The Court Acknowledges the Illegitimate, 118 U. PA. L. REv. 1
(1969); Note, 49 TEx. L. REv. 1132, 1133-34 & n.14 (1971). The Comment to the UPA also
includes North Dakota and Alaska. But none of these states with the possible exception of
Oregon, has provided equal legal status and equal legal relationships to all children in all
substantive areas. See ALASKA STAT. § 25.20.050(a) (1962); Aiuz. REv. STAT. § 14-206 (1956)
(repealed 1973); N.D. CENT. CODE § 56-01-05 (Supp. 1969).
305. California, Hawaii, Montana, North Dakota and Washington.
306. TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-234 (1977).
307. UPA § 15(a).
308. Id. §§ 15(b), 23.
309. Id. § 15(c).
310. Id. P 15(d).
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capacity of the child for education, including higher education; (6)
the age of the child; (7) the financial resources and earning capabili-
ties of the child; (8) the responsibility of the parents for the support
of others; and (9) the value of services contributed by the custodial
parent.
Section 15 provides the flexibility necessary for the appropriate
orders and amount of support to be made, as with legitimate chil-
dren in a divorce proceeding. It is adaptable by all states regardless
of how the state allocates the responsibility of support between the
parents.
The first eight criteria under section 15(e) are generally ac-
cepted. The last, "the value of the services contributed by the cus-
todial parent," has not been uncovered in the author's research.
Regardless of its novelty it represents a sensible effort to more
equally shift the responsibility for the child's existence. Declaring
that parents are equally responsible and then permitting the father
to discharge his obligation by paying fifty percent of the child's
anticipated needs is inequitable. While child-rearing can be a joy,
it also represents an enormous expenditure of time and energy. The
mother is performing her own moral and legal obligation in caring
for the child but she is also relieving the father of that responsibility.
V. BLOOD TESTING
A. Necessity for Blood Testing
In the appraisal of one judge: "Without . . . [blood grouping
tests], the rules of evidence relating to proof of paternity have not
changed much since our judicial ancestors threw witches into a New
England pond and judged them according to whether they sank or
swam."
311
The Department of Health, Education and Welfare has pro-
posed offering massive support to states to identify and locate fa-
thers of both legitimate and illegitimate children.3 12 The regulations
recommend the use of blood tests and polygraphs to establish pa-
ternity. 313 These proposals were enacted in 1975. 3'
311. Judge Cook in Libertowski v. Hojara, 141 Ind. App. 439, 445, 228 N.E.2d 422, 425
(Ind. App. 1967), quoted in H. KRUaSE, ILLEGITIMACY: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY at 123 (1971).
312. Proposed HEW Reg. § 304.20(b)(2)(i), 40 Fed. Reg. 20286-87 (1975) (codified at 45
C.F.R. § 304.10 et. seq.).
313. Id. § 304.20(b)(2)(i)(B).
314. Social Services Amendments of 1974. Pub. L. 93-647, 88 Stat. 2337 (1975) (codified
at 42 U.S.C. § 301 et. seq.).
45 C.F.R. § 303.5(c) calls upon the state agency handling AFDC to
identify laboratories within the State which perform legally and medically accept-
[Vol. 32:339
EQUAL PROTECTION FOR ILLEGITIMATES
Florida's paternity statute is conspicuously lacking any provi-
sion relating to the use of blood tests. Apparently they are used as
a standard practice on the request of the defendant for the purposes
of exclusion only. The omission of blood tests is unforgiveable for
five reasons:" 5 (1) they deter a woman from bringing false claims;
(2) they help detect false charges of paternity; (3) a blood test exclu-
sion overcomes the presumption of legitimacy; (4) blood tests have
shown that thirty percent of the men brought before the New York
City Court who deny paternity and demand a blood test are actually
not the fathers of the children in question; (5) blood tests have
shown that eighteen percent of the men who admit paternity are
actually not the fathers of the children they acknowledge.
"It has long been suspected-even recognized-that there is
considerable perjury committed in the trial of disputed paternity
cases."3"6 The temptation to perjure oneself flows naturally from the
nature of the act sought to be proved. Generally speaking, the
mother alone (and in some circumstances, not even she) can be
certain when and with whom conception occurred. To present her
case, the mother need only demonstrate that she had sexual inter-
course with the alleged father at some time during the three-month
period surrounding the date of the child's probable conception. ' 7
The alleged father usually asserts one of two defenses: he may deny
any sexual intercourse with the mother during the three-month pe-
riod, or he may claim that the mother also had intercourse with
other men during this period"'S-the defense of exceptio plurium
concumbentium. Without additional, impartial evidence, the court
or jury must reach a verdict on the testimony of these parties alone.
A study319 has revealed that 93 percent of the tested parties in
312 disputed paternity cases over a six year period, "lied in some
respect when they testified in court as to their sexual relation-
ship."320 Fifty-seven percent of the witnesses who testified in court
that they, too, had sexual intercourse with the mother during the
able tests, including blood tests, which tend to identify the father or exclude the
alleged father from paternity. A list of such laboratories shall be available to the
appropriate courts and law enforcement officials, and to the public upon request.
See generally Polesky and Krause, Blood Typing in Disputed Paternity Cases-Capabilities
of American Laboratories, 10 FAM. L.Q. 287 (1976).
315. These reasons are enumerated in S. SCiATKIN, 1 DISPUTED PATERNITY PROCEEDINGS
§ 18.01 (1975) [hereinafter cited as SCHATKIN].
316. Id.
317. Id. at § 18.02.
318. Id.
319. Arther and Reid, Utilizing the Lie Detector to Determine the Truth in Disputed
Paternity Cases, 45 J. CRIM. L.C. & P.S. 213 (1954-1955).
320. Id. at 215.
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relevant three-month period confessed to the lie detector examiner
that they had not.2 ' Over forty percent of the tested mothers admit-
ted to having had sexual relations with others during the period of
possible conception.322
The actual known error at the Reid laboratories (where the lie
detector tests were carried out) over the six year testing period was
less than .0007.313 Arther and Reid report that when lie detector tests
are properly administered they should achieve an accuracy of 95
percent, with a four percent margin for possible error.324 Despite this
high degree of accuracy, the results of lie detector tests are generally
not admissible as evidence unless both parties agree to submit to
them and agree that the results will be admitted regardless of their
outcome. 3 5 However, the results of blood testing are afforded greater
weight as scientific evidence than the results of the newer, less reli-
able polygraph tests.
B. Constitutionality
Compulsory blood testing has withstood every imaginable con-
stitutional challenge32 including: invasion of privacy,327 denial of the
privilege against self-incrimination,328 illegal search and seizure, 329
and a denial of fourteenth amendment due process guarantees. 30
C. Accuracy
Numerous books and law review articles have recently reported
on the degrees of accuracy which are attainable in the determina-
tion of paternity through blood tests. Only three of a possible 57
blood tests are frequently performed in the United States, testing
the A-B-O, M-N, and Rh-Hr systems. 331 This combination yields an
exclusion level of approximately 53 percent.332 One writer estimates
321.' Id.
322. Id.
323. Id. at 216 n.5.
324. Id.
325. Id. at 215.
326. See generally Twardy, Blood Groups in Bastardy, Paternity, Heredity and Criminal
Cases, 1976 MED. TIALL TECH. Q. 317, 335; Larson, Blood Test Exclusion Procedures in
Paternity Litigation: The Uniform Acts and Beyond 13 J. F~A. L.Q. 713, 733-34 (1973-1974).
327. Anthony v. Anthony, 9 N.J. Super. 411, 74 A.2d 919 (1950).
328. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966); State v. Cornett, 391 P.2d 277 (Okla.
1964); State v. Goyet, 120 Vt. 12, 132 A.2d 623 (1957).
329. Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
330. Id.; Rochin v. California, 342 U.S. 165 (1952).
331. H. KRAUSE, ILLEGrnMAcy: LAW AND SOCIAL POLICY 130 (1971); SCHATKIN, supra note
315 at § 8.04 (rev. 4th ed. 1977); Larson, supra note 326.
332. Krause, supra note 331, at 126.
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that the use of additional tests would bring the probability of exclu-
sion to over 90 percent; 3 a more recent estimate raises this figure
to over 99 percent. 34 Schatkin maintains a probability of exclusion
of practically 100 per cent.35
Thus, blood tests can accurately identify the non-father and by
negative implication, the father. How reliable are they? Schatkin's
belief in the "unerring accuracy of blood tests" is substantiated by
the mother's confessions subsequent to paternity exclusions. He
reports336 that in 656 blood tests carried out in affiliation cases in
New York City during a ten year period, there were 65 exclusions.
"[Elach and every one of those 65 exclusions was followed by the
mother's subsequent confession, for the first time, of sexual rela-
tions with another man about the time she became pregnant. '337
He also reports similar results from the records of the Children's
Court in Buffalo, New York. One hundred one blood tests resulted
in 13 exclusions. "Twelve of the mothers thereupon admitted sexual
relations with other men around the conception period (which fact
had been suppressed up to then) and the thirteenth withdrew her
complaint." 33 The number of blood tests carried out in continental
Europe (where they are routine and compulsory in paternity pro-
ceedings)3 9 is in the tens of thousands. "What convinced the Euro-
pean Courts of the utter infallibility of the test was the fact that the
thousands of exclusions obtained were almost invariably followed by
the mother's belated confessions, and prosecutions and convictions
for, perjury. "340
Almost as revealing as the actual test results is the suspicious
behavior of the mother who has brought the suit. She may refuse
initially to submit to tests, delay unduly before taking them and be
visibly apprehensive pending the test results. 4'
Schatkin summarizes seven factors which, he contends, all but
confirm the conclusive accuracy of blood tests in paternity cases:
342
(1) mother's confessions subsequent to exclusions; (2) highly fre-
quent incidence of exclusions in doubtful cases; (3) almost 100 per-
cent incidence of inconclusive results where the prosecution is con-
333. Larson, supra note 326, at 739.
334. Lee, Current Status of Paternity Testing, 9 FAM. L.Q. 615, 615 (1975).
335. SCHATKIN, supra note 315, at § 8.04.





341. Id. § 11.02.
342. Id.
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vinced of the mother's veracity; (4) high percentage of exclusion
where the mother betrayed apprehension about taking the tests; (5)
unconvincing nature of the mother's testimony in those cases which
went to trial despite the finding of exclusion; (6) frequency of exclu-
sion in annulment actions which involved antenuptial sex relations;
(7) multiple exclusion under the different systems A-B-O, M-N Rh-
Hr.
D. Current State Provisions
Considering the constitutionality, predictability and accuracy
of blood tests in determining paternity, one might well assume that
all states would have encouraged the use of these tests through
legislation which compels their use in paternity proceedings, estab-
lishes uniform standards for testing and evidentiary use, and pro-
vides for the creation of a centralized laboratory which is highly
specialized in the newer, sophisticated tests. Nevertheless, a scant
majority of the states specifically allow for the use of blood tests in
paternity proceedings and only eight have adopted the Uniform Act
on Blood Tests to Determine Paternity (UBTA). 43 In many states,
the court may order blood tests only on the motion of the alleged
father;3 144 although in other states, including those which have
adopted the UBTA and the UPA, 345 the motion may be made by any
interested party 36 or the court may order tests on its own initia-
tive .3
343. CAL. EvID. CODE §§ 890-97 (West 1968); ILL. ANN. STATS. ch. 106 3/4, §§ 1-7 (Smith-
Hurd 1977); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 9:396 to 9:398 (West Supp. 1977); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN.
§ 522:1-:10 (1955); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, §§ 501-08 (West Supp. 1976-1977); Oa. REV. STAT.
§§ 109.250-.262 (1975-1976); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, §§ 307.1-.10 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978);
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-45a-7 to 78-45a-17 (Supp. 1975).
344. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 12(5) (Supp. 1973); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.081 (Baldwin
1973); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66G (1973 & Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, §
12A (West 1970); MICH. COMp. LAWS ANN. § 722.716 (Supp. 1977- 1978); Miss. CODE ANN. §§
93-9-21, -27 (1972); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 532 (1974 & Supp. 1976); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-7
(1976); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 3111.16 (Supp. 1976); TENN. CODE ANN. § 36-228 (1977); W.
VA. CODE § 48-7-8 (Supp. 1975).
345. See note 343 supra for list of states which have adopted the UBTA. UPA adopting
states are: California, which has also enacted the UBTA, CAL. EVID. CODE §§ 890-97 (West
1968) and therefore deletes the UPA provisions; HAW. REV. STAT. § 584-1 to -26 (Supp. 1975);
MONT. REV. CODES ANN. § 61-312(1) (Supp. 1975); N.D. CENT. CODE §§ 14-17-10, -11 (Supp.
1975); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. §§ 26.26.100, .110 (Supp. 1976).
346. IDAHO CODE § 7-1115 (Supp. 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 277 (Supp. 1976-
1977); VA. CODE § 8-329.1 (Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 52.36(2) (West Supp. 1976-1977).
347. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-2343 (West 1966); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 277 (Supp.
1976-1977); MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66G (Supp. 1976); MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, §
12A (West 1970); MIH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.716(a) (Supp. 1977-1978); R.I. GEN. LAWS §
15-8-13 (Supp. 1976); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 13.02 (Vernon Supp. 1976). For the
Montana, North Dakota and Washington citations see note 345 supra; for the Utah citation,
see note 343 supra.
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The effect of a party's refusal to submit to blood tests is not
uniform. In some states the fact of refusal is admissible against the
mother34 or child,349 or against the alleged father 5.3 Refusal may
result in a dismissal 35 ' or in the possibility of an unfavorable rul-
ing.3 12 In one jurisdiction, the results of blood tests are admissible
only if the putative father does not object. 353 In two non-uniform
UBTA states and in eleven others, 354 results are admissible only if
there has been exclusion. In the remaining fourteen states355 results
are admissible with all available evidence if the experts disagree on
the question of exclusion and the results tend to show the possibility
of paternity. And contrary to common sense, in only six states other
than the eight which have adopted the UBTA355 does a conclusive
exclusion result in dismissal.
348. ALA. CODE tit. 26, § 12(5) (Supp. 1973) (against the mother); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN.
ch. 273, § 12A (West 1970) (against one of the parties); OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.16 (Supp.
1976) (against either party); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-13 (Supp. 1976) (against either party); TEX.
FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 13.02 (Vernon Supp. 1976)(mother's refusal results in a dismissal;
father's refusal is admissible against him); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 52.36(3)(West Supp. 1976-
1977)(against any party).
349. MD. ANN. CODE art. 16, § 66G (Supp. 1976); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.716(a)
(Supp. 1977-1978).
350. Massachusetts, Ohio, Rhode Island, Texas, Wisconsin. For statutory citations see
note 348 supra.
351. TEx. FAm. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 13.02 (Vernon Supp. 1976) (when the mother refuses,
suit is dismissed).
352. IDAHO CODE § 7-1115 (Supp. 1976); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 406.081 (Baldwin
1976) (UAP: if mother refuses court can resolve against her unless the suit was brought by an
agency contributing to the child's support); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 277 (Supp. 1976-
1977) (UAP, uniform version); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-21 (1972) (UAP, uniform version); OR.
REv. STAT. § 109.252 (1974)(modified UBTA: court can resolve against party who refuses);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78.25-22 (1953 & Supp. 1975) (modified UBTA: same as Oregon provision
supra).
353. D.C. CODE ENCYCL. § 16-2343 (1966).
354. States which have adopted the UBTA in a modified version: ILL. ANN. STATS. ch.
106 3 , § I (Smith-Hurd 1957); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 10, § 504 (West Supp. 1976-1977). Other
states: ALA. CODE tit. 27, § 12(5) (Supp. 1973); ARK. STATS. ANN. § 34-705.1 (1962); MD. ANN.
CODE art. 16, § 66G (Supp. 1976); MAss. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 273, § 12A (West 1970); MICH.
COMP. LAWS ANN. § 722.716(d) (Supp. 1977-1978); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 532 (Supp. 1976);
OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 3111.16 (Supp. 1976); R.I. GEN. LAWS § 15-8-13 (Supp. 1976); TENN.
CODE ANN. § 36-228 (1977); W. VA. CODE § 48-7-8 (Supp. 1975); WiS. STAT. ANN. § 52.36(3)
(West Supp. 1976-1977).
355. CAL. EVID. CODE § 895 (West 1966)(UBTA); Ky. REv. STAT. ANN. § 406.111 (Baldwin
1976)(uniform version UAP); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:397.2 (West Supp. 1977)(UBTA); ME.
REv. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 280 (Supp. 1976-1977)(uniform version UAP); MONT. REV. CODES
ANN. § 61-313(3) (Supp. 1975)(uniform version UPA); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 522:4
(1955)(UBTA); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-7 (1976) (always admissible); N.D. CENT. CODE § 14-
17-11 (Supp. 1975) (uniform version UPA); OR. REV. STAT. § 109.258 (1974)(UBTA); PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 28, § 307.4 (Purdon Supp. 1977-1978)(UBTA); TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 13.05-
.06 (Vernon Supp. 1976); UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 78-25-21, 78-45a-10 (Supp. 1975); VA. CODE §
8-329:1 (Supp. 1976) (always admissible); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.26.1 (Supp. 1976)(uni-
form version, UPA).
356. Ky. REV. STATS. ANN. § 406.111 (Baldwin 1976); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 19, § 280
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E. Comparison of the Uniform Act on Blood Tests to Determine
Paternity with Relevant Provisions of the Uniform Act on Paternity
and the Uniform Parentage Act
The three attempts to achieve uniform standards are remark-
ably similar in most respects. Three similarities are of particular
significance: (1) when blood tests will be ordered; (2) what eviden-
tiary effect will be given the results; and (3) by whom the compensa-
tion of experts and costs of the tests will be paid.
All three Acts provide that the court may order blood tests on
its own initiative and shall order them at the request of the mother,
child or putative father."'
Under section 4 of the UBTA and section 10 of the UAP an
exclusion will result in dismissal; and if the experts disagree in their
findings or conclusions, the question will be submitted on all the
evidence. If the experts conclude that the blood tests show the possi-
bility of the alleged father's paternity, the court has discretion to
admit this evidence depending on the infrequency of the blood
type. ' The UPA represents a significant evolution from the other
two Acts. It provides that "[e]vidence relating to paternity may
include . . .blood test results, weighted in accordance with evi-
dence, if available, of the statistical probability of the alleged fa-
ther's paternity . ..-
Provisions for the compensation of expert witnesses and test
costs under the UBTA are virtually identical in providing for pro-
portionate allocation of expenses at the discretion of the court
among the parties and the appropriate public authority.9 0
F. Recommendations
It is submitted that all three Acts are deficient in failing to
make the use of blood tests compulsory in actions involving patern-
ity.3"' The sanction against the mother's refusal-a dismissal of her
suit-fails to consider the principal party whose interests are at
stake in the paternity proceeding. While her refusal may reflect
poorly on the merits of her claim, the child should not thereby be
(Supp. 1976-1977); Miss. CODE ANN. § 93-9-2 (1972); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 49-7 (1976); TEX. FAM.
CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 13.05 (Vernon Supp. 1976); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 52.36(3) (West Supp. 1976-
1977).
357. UBTA § 1; UAP § 7; UPA § 11.
358. UAP § 10.
359. UPA § 12(3).
360. UBTA § 3; UAP § 9; UPA § 16.
361. See Krause, Scientific Evidence and the Ascertainment of Paternity, 5 FAM. L.Q.
252, 269 (1971).
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deprived of the opportunity of learning that the putative father is
or is not his own.
Similarly, the costs for the tests initially should be at public
expense, without regard to the financial ability of the mother and
putative father36 to pay. The parties who stand most to benefit by
competent accurate testing are the child (who is dependent and
thus "indigent") and the state which may thereby be relieved of its
responsibility in parens patriae for the child's support. When pa-
ternity is established, the father might then be required to pay the
costs of the test, along with other court costs.363 A survey of laborato-
ries found that the charge for administering three standard tests to
three individuals ranged from $10 to $150, with a mean charge of
$42.114 Another commentator estimates that the costs for the entire
battery of 57 serologic tests would be approximately $150 per per-
son.
365
Another serious shortcoming in the Acts is the failure to estab-
lish evidentiary guidelines. The two earlier acts specify that a con-
clusive exclusion will result in dismissal. The UPA has no such
provision. In only fifteen states 6 will a dismissal be mandated. This
seems contrary to logic. 67 Apart from this provision, the language
of the UPA is satisfactory.
According to one scientist: "In the United States it would not
be difficult at present to perform tests providing a 70% chance of
exclusion. As demands and interest increase, it may be possible in
the near future to use tests providing more than a 90% chance of
exclusion." ' In order to take advantage of this potential, guidelines
must be established to assure that parties and specimens are accur-
ately identified,6 tests are performed only in qualified laborato-
ries, 370 and that results are admissible into evidence through verified
362. Id. at 268-69.
363. Id.
364. Polesky and Krause, Blood Typing in Disputed Paternity Cases-Capabilities of
American Laboratories, 10 FAM. L.Q. 287, 292 (1976).
365. Shaw and Kass, Illegitimacy, Child Support and Paternity Testing, 13 Hous. L.
REV. 41, 58 (1975).
366. UBTA states: California, Illinois, Louisiana, Oklahoma, Oregon and Pennsylvania.
UAP states: Kentucky, Maine, Mississippi, Montana, New Hampshire, and Utah. Also,
North Carolina, Texas and Wisconsin.
367. See SCiTKIN, supra note 315, at § 9.04.
368. Chang Ling Lee, The Current Status of Paternity Testing, 9 FAM. L.Q. 615, 633
(1975).
369. See Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, Present Status of Serologic Testing in Problems
of Disputed Parentage, 10 FAM. L.Q. 247, 280-82 (1976).
370. Krause, supra note 361, at 269-70; Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 369, at
293; Larson, supra note 326, at 735; Lee, supra note 368, at 633.
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certificates which assure compliance with the proper procedures.37'
VI. OTHER COMMENDABLE ASPECTS OF THE UNIFORM PARENTAGE ACT
AND SUGGESTIONS FOR THEIR IMPROVEMENT
Section 5 of the Act gives summary, but nonetheless adequate,
treatment to the parentage of a child produced by artificial insemi-
nation of semen donated by one other than the mother's husband.
The husband is treated in law as if he were the natural father pro-
vided that he has consented in writing to the procedure. The choice
of phrase "natural father" is unfortunate because although the UPA
proclaims equal rights and duties between parents and children
regardless of marital status, "natural" connotes a biological, not
"legal" relationship. Surely the drafters intend for no further action
to be needed to confirm such a" child's legitimate status. A less
ambiguous statement can be found in section 742.11, Florida Stat-
utes: "Any child born within wedlock who has been conceived by
the means of artificial insemination is irrebuttably presumed to be
legitimate, provided that both husband and wife have consented in
writing to the artificial insemination." 372
The long-arm provision of section 8(b) of the UPA is "novel,"
but more rational and straightforward than the strained approach
taken in Poindexter v. Willis. 373 In that case the general long-arm
statute was applied by treating the father's failure to support his
illegitimate child as a "tortious act." Section 8(b) of the UPA pro-
vides that "[a] person who has sexual intercourse in this State
thereby submits to the jurisdiction of the courts of this state . . .
with respect to a child who may have been conceived by that act of
intercourse." This section is clearly in keeping with the prevalent
belief that fathers should not be able to evade their parental obliga-
tions by skipping from one jurisdiction to another. The Uniform
Reciprocal Enforcement of Support Act, 374 or its 1968 revision, has
been adopted in every state, the District of Columbia, Guam,
Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands . 75 Another device to thwart eva-
371. Joint AMA-ABA Guidelines, supra note 369, at 282-83; Krause, supra note 361, at
270.
372. FLA. STAT. § 742.11 (1975).
373. 87 Il. App. 2d 13, 231 N.E.2d 1 (1967). The Illinois judgment was given full faith
and credit by Ohio in 23 Ohio Misc. 199, 256 N.E.2d 254 (1970).
374. U.R.E.S.A. dates from 1950 and was amended in 1952 and 1958. The 1950 version
has been adopted in 26 states, the District of Columbia, Guam, Puerto Rico and the Virgin
Islands.
375. U.R.E.S.A. 1968 Revised Act has been adopted in 24 states. For a list of statutory
citations for both Acts see 9 UNIF. LAWS ANNOT. 383, 399 (Supp. 1974-1976).
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sion is the Parent Locator Service,37 which was created to give more
people access to information which could assist in locating the ab-
sent parent. The Texas long-arm statute,377 applicable to suits
"affecting the parent-child relationship," is more delicately phrased
than section 8(b) of the UPA and is as far-reaching as is constitu-
tionally permissible and thus is preferable to the uniform version.378
A guardian (general or ad litem) shall represent a minor child
in the action, pursuant to section 9 of the UPA. This provision is a
necessary safeguard to the child's rights against the possible collu-
sion of his parents. For example, the mother might prefer a lump-
sum settlement even though smaller periodic payments would be in
the best interest of the child. Without a guardian the child's interest
would not be properly represented.
Section 10 makes provision for pre-trial proceedings: the public
shall be barred; witnesses and parties can be compelled to testify;
if their testimony is compelled following a refusal on the grounds of
self-incrimination they may be granted immunity from all criminal
liability on account of the testimony (except perjury); rules of evi-
dence need not be followed; and relevant medical evidence is not
privileged. These procedures are aimed at facilitating the ascertain-
ment of truth. By guaranteeing privacy, compelling testimony but
granting immunity where necessary and relaxing evidentiary rules,
many of the impediments under state statutes are removed. Simi-
larly, section 20 promotes the pursuit of the truth by guaranteeing
the confidentiality of hearings and records.
376. Formerly only state or local welfare agencies were authorized to obtain the absent
parent's address or last known employer's address from the Department of Health, Education
and Welfare (under 42 U.S.C. § 1306(c)(1)(A) (1974)) or the Internal Revenue Service (under
42 U.S.C. § 610 (1974)) under certain conditions. Now, under 42 U.S.C. § 653 (1975), author-
ized persons include: any parent, guardian, or attorney acting on behalf of an abandoned
child; any official of a court having jurisdiction to issue a support order in the case; and any
agency of a state participating in the federal AFDC program. For a thorough discussion of
the new child support provisions see Bernet, The Child Support Provisions: Comments on
the New Federal Law, 9 FAM. L.Q. 491 (1975).
377. TEx. FAM. CODE ANN. tit. 2, § 11.051 (Vernon Supp. 1976-1977).
378. In a suit affecting the parent-child relationship, the court may exercise personal
jurisdiction over a person on whom service of citation is required or over the person's personal
representative, although the person is not a resident or domiciliary of this state, if:
(1) the child was conceived in this state and the person on whom service is
tequired is a parent or an alleged or probable father of the child;
(2) the child resides in this state . . . as a result of the acts or directives or
with the approval of the person on whom service is required;
(3) the person on whom service is required has resided with the child in this
state; or
(4) notwithstanding Subdivisions (1), (2), or (3) above, there is any basis
consistent with the constitutions of this state or the United States for the exercise
of personal jurisdiction.
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A pre-trial settlement opportunity is incorporated into section
13 of the UPA. After evaluating the evidence of the hearing, the
judge shall make "an appropriate recommendation for settle-
ment ' ' 375 which may include the following: dismissal with or without
prejudice; a compromise by which paternity would not be estab-
lished but the alleged father would agree to undertake an economic
obligation for the benefit of the child; and a voluntary acknowledge-
ment of paternity by the father. If the parties agree to the judge's
proposals judgment will be entered. If the parties do not agree the
case will be set for trial.
A significant step toward abolishing the exceptio plurium
concumbentium defense was taken in section 14(b) and (c). 31" This
defense permits the alleged father to refute paternity by proving
that the mother had sexual intercourse with other men during the
three-month period of possible conception. That defense is a fertile
ground for perjury because it is one of the few available to an ac-
cused man. The others-impotence and sterility, for exam-
ple,-could be substantiated medically. The exceptio defense has
resulted in sordid and wanton attacks on the mother's character."8
What is more serious, however, is that establishment of the fact of
intercourse with another man at or about the time of probable con-
ception will preclude determination of which man is the father,
unless the father's identification is possible through blood tests or
other means." 2 Thus, absent thorough blood testing, a woman's
"indiscretion" can deprive her child of all the rights which attach
to a child whose paternity is established through adjudication.
Section 19 of the UPA adopts the criminal law mandate that
379. UPA § 13(a).
380. (b) Testimony relating to sexual access to the mother by an unidentified
man at any time or by an identified man at a time other than the probable time
of conception of the child is inadmissible in evidence, unless offered by the
mother.
(c) In an action against an alleged father, evidence offered by him with
respect to a man who is not subject to the jurisdiction of the court concerning his
sexual intercourse with the mother at or about the probable time of conception
of the child is admissible in evidence only if he has undergone and made available
to the court blood tests the results of which do not exclude the possibility of his
paternity of the child. A man who is identified and is subject to the jurisdiction
of the court shall be made a defendant in the action.
381. See Commentary to UPA § 14.
382. Yarmark v. Strickland, 193 So. 2d 212 (Fla. 3d Dist. 1966). Here a child was denied
the opportunity to establish a parent-child relationship with his father because the "other
man" was not joined as a defendant and no blood tests were performed. Notwithstanding the
economic and social implications of bastardy to the child, the court refused to permit the trier
of facts to determine which of the two men was the father where the result would be based
on speculation.
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counsel be appointed for a party who is financially unable to obtain
counsel. This provision reflects the serious nature of the paternity
suit. By extending the right to counsel to either party it recognizes
the important consequences to the child if paternity is established,
and the burden which may be imposed on the proven father. The
inherent difficulties those types of actions raise, especially in the
area of proof, and the necessity for a correct judgment,. are addi-
tional concerns which are to be safeguarded. Representation of
counsel for all parties, to insure that all defenses are presented and
a judgment reached on all competent (and only competent) evi-
dence, will best serve the competing interests involved.
Under section 21 the applicable provisions of the UPA may be
used to determine the existence of a mother-child relationship. The
need for such a proceeding would arise infrequently. Nevertheless
it is wise to have the same procedures and safeguards applicable to
these actions.
Finally, section 24 of the UPA is addressed to the custodial
proceedings necessary should the mother choose to relinquish the
child for adoption. Before the termination of the father's parental
rights is possible, extensive procedures are required to guarantee his
right to due process. If the efforts to identify and locate the father
are successful he is entitled to notice and a hearing. If the father
cannot be identified, the rights of the child's adoptive family prevail
to finally cut off the natural father's parental rights six months after
a court decree to that effect. 83 This, or a similar framework, is
constitutionally required by Stanley v. Illinois.384 There the Su-
preme Court held that the fathers of illegitimate children could not
be deprived of their right to custody without the same hearing and
proof of neglect to which unmarried mothers and divorced and mar-
ried parents are entitled.
One last recommendation remains to be noted: the use of poly-
graph tests in pre-trial procedures involving paternity questions.
Both Krause3 and Schatkin86 advocate the use of lie detector tests
383. The rights of the putative father are beyond the scope of this Comment. See
generally Comment, The Putative Father-The Evolving Constitutional Concepts of Due
Process and Equal Protection, 2 W. ST. U.C.L.L. REV. 261 (1975); Comment, The Emerging
Constitutional Protection of the Putative Father's Parental Rights, 70 MIH. L. REv. 1581
(1972); Note, Father of an Illegitimate Child-His Right to be Heard, 50 MINN. L. REV. 1071
(1966); Note, Rights of a Putative Father in Relation to his Illegitimate Child: A Question of
Equal Protection, 22 SYRACUSE L. REV. 770 (1971); Note, The "Strange Boundaries" of Stan-
ley: Providing Notice of Adoption to the Unknown Putative Father, 59 VA. L. REv. 517 (1973).
384. 405 U.S. 645 (1972).
385. Krause, Scientific Evidence and the Ascertainment of Paternity, 5 FAM. L.Q. 252,
277-80 (1971).
386. S. SCHATKIN, supra note 333, §§ 18.01-.17.
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in the determination of paternity. Their degree of reliability remains
in dispute:"7 so that mandatory use and admission of the results in
evidence at trial is not yet advisable. But they can perform a valua-
ble function at the pre-trial stage in discouraging perjury and elicit-
ing post-result confessions from witnesses who are informed that
they have lied to the examiner. As with blood testing, the strictest
precautions must be taken to assure the competency of the exam-
iner. The Reid laboratories"' found an actual known error of less
than .0007 for a six year period but warn: "Far less accuracy will
prevail, however, when the examiner is lacking in basic qualifica-
tions, adequate training, sufficient experience, general competence,
or complete honesty. The lie-detector is far from the automatic
device some persons think it to be." 3 '
VII. CHILD SUPPORT ENFORCEMENT MECHANISMS IN BRIEF
Eight billion dollars went to recipients of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children (AFDC) in 1974. 31" In eighty-three percent of
the families one parent was absent. 9' It is not surprising that Con-
gress has enacted amendments to the Social Security Act to reduce
the mounting figures and discourage desertion." 2 Their efforts have
been directed three ways. To be eligible, applicants for AFDC must:
(1) furnish the state agency with their social security number;393 (2)
assign the state their accrued rights (or those of a recipient family
member) to support from another person;394 and (3) cooperate with
the state in establishing the paternity of an illegitimate child for
whom aid is claimed and assist in obtaining support payments due
the applicant for the child.9 ' A recipient-parent who fails to cooper-
ate will face termination of the AFDC payments. 9 The payments
to eligible children will continue as protective payments397 despite
the parent's non-cooperation.
387. Krause, supra note 385, at 280. Contra, ScHATKiN, supra note 315, at §§ 18.02-09.
388. See text accompanying notes 319-24 supra.
389. SCHATKIN, supra note 315, at § 18.02.
390. U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT (1976) at
319. The exact figure is 7.99 billion.
391. Id. at 320.
392. HEW found that desertion affected as many families as did divorce and that its
incidence is highest among those in the lower socio-economic classes. Quenstedt, The Dis-
rupted Family as a Public Responsibility, 3 FAM. L.Q. 24 (1967).
393. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(25)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
394. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(A) (Supp. V 1975).
295. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(B) (Supp. V 1975).
396. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(26)(B)(ii) (Supp. V 1975).
397. Id.
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One writer estimates that "the amount the government realisti-
cally can expect to collect if paternity is established for every child
[receiving AFDC] (an unlikely prospect) is in the range of $28
million per week." ' The potential recovery, pven assuming a deter-
mination of paternity in only half the cases, is quite significant.
Constitutional challenges to the new child support enforcement
provisions on the grounds of equal protection and privacy have boon
intelligently evaluated by several commentators " and are beyond
the scope of this comment.
VIII. CONCLUSION
The Child Support Enforcement mechanisms applicable to
AFDC recipients are hindered by unresponsive paternity statutes.
The economic interests of illegitimate children and of the govern-
ment which have been examined in this article are not served by
provisions which make it difficult to bring suit against the putative
father. These interests are further stymied by anachronistic pro-
ceedings. Without the establishment of paternity, the equality man-
dated by the Supreme Court remains an empty promise. It is in the
hands of the legislatures to see that this promise is fulfilled.
398. Poulin, supra note 398, at 922. The figure was derived as follows:
The average support order entered in paternity suits, according to a study of one
Michigan county, is about $20 per child per week. Thus, if each child had a
support order entered on its behalf, the amount owed could be about $40 million
per week. There is evidence, however, that the amount collected under support
decrees generally falls short of the amount owed. In a random sample of paternity
cases from one county, about 70 percent of the amount owed was paid. There-
fore, the amount the government realistically can expect to collect if paternity is
established for every child (an unlikely prospect) is in the range of $28 million
per week. Although tenuous, these figures do prove an indication of the fiscal
results sought through parental support enforcement schemes.
Id. at 921-22 (footnotes omitted).
399. Bernet, The Child Support Provisions: Comments on the New Federal Law, 9 FAM.
L.Q. 491 (1975); Poulin, Illegitimacy and Family Privacy: A Note on Maternal Cooperation
in Paternity Suits, 70 Nw. U.L. REv. 910 (1976); Comment, The Social Services Amendments
of 1974: Constitutionality of Conditioning AFDC Grant Eligibility on Disclosure of Paternity
of Illegitimate Child, 64 GEO. L.J. 947 (1976).
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